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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FLORIDA FAIR TRADE
ACT AND CONTINUING MYTHS OF
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
ROBERT HUDSON*

Throughout recorded history, men subject to the economic laws of
competition have endeavored to limit and overcome the restrictive effects
of these laws by obtaining non-competitive advantages. One of the techniques frequently employed to achieve this end has been collective pricefixing.' As a result of its incompatability with the concept of free competition, price-fixing was one of the first practices to be condemned under
the antitrust laws. 2 In stark contrast to the vigorous antitrust policy against
price-fixing, special laws have been enacted by the federal and state governments, which specifically exempt certain vertical price-fixing agreements. In
light of the obvious contradictions of policy between these so-called "fair
trade" laws and the antitrust laws, it is not surprising that since their
enactment during the depression of the 1930's, the fair trade laws have
generated a continuing debate and persistent litigation on their constitutionality as well as their purported and actual effects on the American
economy. The fact that the Florida Fair Trade Act has already been declared unconstitutional three times, twice on essentially anti-competitive
grounds, is illustrative of this controversy.3
This article will examine the constitutionality of the present Florida
Fair Trade Act and the economic validity of the arguments supporting
fair trade laws. In addition, it will be necessary to examine the economic
and legal origins and evolution of fair trade, the litigation concerning the
Florida Fair Trade Act, and the principal arguments for and against
fair trade's continued application.
BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF FAIR TRADE

Fair trade is designed to permit what is variously referred to as resale
price maintenance, resale price fixing, or vertical trade agreements. 4 In

0

J.D. 1971, University of Florida; LL.M. 1972, New York University.
1. See Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUm. L. Rav. 377, 582-85 (1965).
2. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911).
3. The Florida Fair Trade Act was first held unconstitutional in 1939 on what must
be considered a technicality. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut-Rate Drug Co., Inc., 137 Fla.
508, 188 So. 91 (1939). The act was again ruled unconstitutional in its entirety in Liquor
Stores, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949), largely on anticompetitive grounds. The nonsigner clause was held unconstitutional on similar grounds
in Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckert, 73 So. 2d 680 (1954).
4. Vertical trade agreements should be carefully distinguished from "horizontal" trade
agreements. Horizontal agreements are between persons of the same class or level, such as
between manufacturers or between wholesalers. Horizontal agreements are illegal under
the Sherman Act. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 190
(1936).
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essence, it allows the manufacturer of a brand name product to fix the
minimum or "stipulated" price 5 at which the product must be sold8 by
subsequent wholesalers and retailers.7 Because the retailers are restricted
from selling below this minimum or, in the case of stipulated price, at any
other price, the vertical price-fixing agreement serves to eliminate "intrabrand",, competition among the retailers of the product.
While vertical trade agreements were allowed at common law when
they did not constitute common law unfair competition, 9 the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 189010 raised doubts about their legality. The doubts
were confirmed in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co."
wherein in 1911 the United States Supreme Court declared such vertical
price-fixing agreements to be an unlawful restraint of trade under the
Sherman Act. Apparently, the Dr. Miles case had precluded the possibility
of resale price maintenance,12 but in 1919 United States v. Colgate & Co.1 3
reopened the question by expanding the right to refuse to deal.14 In Colgate
the Supreme Court recognized a producer's right to set conditions under
which he would deal with a retailer-including a stipulation of a minimum
5. Fair trade acts in some states authorize the manufacturer to fix minimum resale
prices, while others authorize absolute or "stipulated" resale price-fixing. The Florida Fair
Trade Act allows only minimum resale price maintenance. See 2 CCH TRADE Ra. REP.
6041, at 9087 (1971).
6051-52, at
6. For examples of fair trade contracts see 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
9101-04 (1971).
7. Legal means other than fair trade used by manufacturers to control prices are
vertical integration with retailer outlets, franchise selling, direct selling by the manufacturers to consumers other than in retail outlets, and true consignments in which the
risk of loss is on the manufacturer.
8. "Intra-brand" competition refers to competition between retailers with respect to
a single product. "Inter-brand" competition, on the other hand, refers to competition between producers of different brand name products. The latter is said to be unaffected by
fair trade laws.
9. Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889). But see Brown, Early English Hostility Toward
Monopolies -An Argument for Voiding Fair Trade Laws, 33 ALBANY L. REv. 136 (1968).
10. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). as amended, 15 U.S.C. §1
(1970).
11. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
12. The Court rejected the contention that a manufacturer is entitled to maintain the
restrictions by virtue of the fact that they relate to products of his own manufacture. The
Court stated that to sustain such restraint, it must be found to be reasonable both with
respect to the public and to the parties, and that it be limited to what is fairly necessary.
But agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public interest and
void. The Court had reviewed the retail agency contract and concluded that the so-called
"retail agents" were not agents at all but were purchasers who buy to sell again as retail
dealers. Id. at 398-406.
13. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
14. This simple unilateral action is a privilege that had been guaranteed by section 2
of the Clayton Act in 1914. That section provides in part that "persons engaged in selling
goods, wares or merchandise in commerce [have the right to select] their own customers in
bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade," 15 U.S.C. §13 (a) (1970) (emphasis
added).
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price at which his product is to be sold. If the retailer did not adhere to
these prices the manufacturer could refuse to sell to him in the future.
However, subsequent decisions declared that if the right to refuse to deal
was employed as part of a resale price maintenance scheme, it was illegal. 5
The path to resale price maintenance was again effectively blocked.
Throughout the 1910's and the 1920's the manufacturers of brand name
products, working through the American Fair Trade League, endeavored
to promote state "fair trade" laws, which would permit vertical price agreements. These laws were necessary, according to the manufacturers, to protect what they believed to be a legitimate property interest in the consumer
appeal of their brand names from the purported evils of loss-leader merchandising. Producers argued that such price cutting created an aura of
cheapness, which destroyed the "goodwill" they had built up through costly
advertising.:6 Although protection of manufacturers' goodwill was to become one of the principal arguments in favor of fair trade laws, it was
insufficient by itself to motivate the state legislators into accepting the fair
trade laws.
With the advent of the economic depression of the 1930's the number
of small retailers declined, while the number and size of large chain and
cutrate stores offering limited services and lower prices increased.Y7 This
decline was a predictable economic result of the depression, but with the
unforeseen expansion of large department and chain stores, the small retailers found a scapegoat on which to blame their economic plight.' s
Apparently believing that relief from the consequences of the depression
and the challenge of the emerging chain stores lay in restrictive legislation,
the independent retailers and wholesalers, particularly in drugs, became the
new champions of fair trade.' 9 The small retailers hoped that resale price
maintenance would serve to considerably restrict the price competition
from the larger retailers, which they believed to be the cause of their
dwinding profit margins. But being understandably apprehensive that
efforts so blatantly opposed to antitrust policy would not receive public
15. Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 US. 707 (1944);
FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252

U.S. 85 (1920).
16. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194 (1936).
17. The statistics indicate there was an over-all decline of the number of retailers
between 1929 and 1933, but by the end of 1934 the number of retailers climbed back up to
its 1929 level and has continued to increase to date. HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, Colonial Times to 1957, at 4-12, 570 (ser. V, 1969). For discussions of the rise of
the large chain and cutrate stores see T. MAHONEY & L. SLOANE, TE GREAT MERacRANTs
1-18 (1966); N. STACEY & A. WILSON, THE CHANGING PATrEN OF DISRIBUTION 126-64 (1965).
See also text accompanying notes 154-159 infra.
18. For a discussion of the effects of price competition on retailers see text accompanying notes 154-159 infra.
19. Organized attempts at price maintenance by the drug industry date to 1876 when
the predecessor of the National Wholesale Druggist's Association was formed to curb
"excessive" competition. Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CH. L. Rav. 825, 826 (1955).
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support, the retailers developed the rationale that the fair trade laws were
necessary to prevent "predatory competition,"20 which would soon leave
only a few giant distributors, who would then charge monopolistic prices.21
Fair trade laws were, therefore, soon being touted as "anti-monopolistic,"
an ironic twist of words for such an anti-competitive device.2 2
Under the great pressure exerted by retailer organizations, particularly
the National Association of Retail Druggists (NARD),2 3 state legislatures
began to respond to the suggested restrictive legislation that the small
retailers hoped would inhibit the growth of chain stores. In 1931 California
became the first state to enact a statute2 4 allowing vertical price-fixing
contracts of the type declared invalid in Dr. Miles.25 In 1933 the California

statute was further strengthened by the addition of a "nonsigners clause,"2 6
which made it unlawful for any retailer to knowingly and willfully sell
below the contract price even though he had not signed the contract himself. This nonsigner clause is considered to be the heart of the fair trade
laws.2 7, Without the clause "fair trade contracts in any state would be
meaningless, because the firms who precipitate price wars are the very ones
2' 8who would not sign the fair trade contract."

Despite the concerted efforts of NARD and the emotional cries of
"predatory competition," "monopoly," and "unfair trade," the actual resuilts of the campaign were minimal. The state legislatures apparently re-

20. For a more complete account of the efforts to conceal the true nature of fair trade
acts see Edwards, Memorandum for the Assistant Attorney General, Re Grounds for the
Repeal of Miller-Tydings Amendment Which Authorizes Resale Contracts (1941), reprinted
in Hearings on H.R. 4365 Before the Antitrust Subcomin. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 436 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Celler Comm. Hearings].
21. For a discussion of the degree of monopolization of the retail markets see text
accompanying notes 162-170 infra.
22. Fair trade laws were only one of several remedies pushed through state legislatures by retail organizations. Tax legislation that discriminated against high volume retailers, so-called "anti-chain store acts," was also enacted. See, e.g., Cal. Stat. ch. 849 (1935);
N.M. Laws Spec. Sess. ch. 33 (1934). Such laws were soon held unconstitutional as violations of equal protection guarantees. See, e.g., Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S.
550 (1935). Additionally, "unfair sales acts" or "unfair trade practices acts" were enacted
to outlaw sales at less than cost to divert trade or injure competitors. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
ANN. §325.04 (1966). Such laws are still in effect in many states. The manifest purpose
of both types of legislation was to provide the small retailer legal shelter against his
larger competitors. The distinction between these acts and "fair trade laws" is primarily
one of scope. Fair trade laws allow resale price maintenance while the acts are more
specifically aimed at "sales below cost" with the intent to monopolize or injure competitors.
23. NARD has claimed credit for the passage of the majority of the state fair trade
acts during the 1930's and the Miller-Tydings Amendment of 1937. Celler Comm. Hearings
797, 799. See also E. GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION 83-106 (1939).
24. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16902 (West 1964).
25. Actually, a 1913 New Jersey statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, §§4-1, -2 (1964), was the
first to provide for a form of resale price maintenance if notice of the price restriction was
affixed to the goods. However, the act proved to be largely ineffective.
26. CAL. PROF. & Bus. CODE §16904 (West 1964).
27. E.g., Humbach, Fair Trade: the Ideal and Reality, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 144, 145 (1966).
28. Celler Comm. Hearings 602.
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mained apprehensive about the holding of Dr. Miles and realized that
most contracts entered pursuant to a state fair trade law would still be in
violation of the Sherman Act. These apprehensions were no doubt compounded when the New York Court of Appeals in 1936 held New York's
fair trade law to be unconstitutional in violating due process, denying
equal protection, and constituting an unlawful delegation of legislative
29
authority.
However, later that same year the United States Supreme Court ruled
in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp.30 that the
Illinois Fair Trade Act31 did not violate any federal constitutional provisions. Recognizing the implications of Old Dearborn, the increasing public
sentiment favoring fair. trade legislation, and the continuing pressure of
retail organizations, Congress seemingly gave its approval to price maintenance by enacting the Miller-Tydings Amendment - to section 1 of the
Sherman Act. It is significant that the Miller-Tydings Amendment failed
to muster sufficient support to be passed on its own. Instead, it was hurriedly
passed as a "rider," without careful consideration of the merits of the
controversial aspects of the subject, to a revenue and appropriations bill
for the District of Columbia. 33 President Franklin D. Roosevelt said he
34
signed the bill with regrets.
Specifically, the Miller-Tydings Amendment exempts from the operation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act certain types of minimum resale price
maintenance, non-"horizontal" agreements 35 (relating to trademarked,
branded, or otherwise identified products sold in interstate commerce) when
such agreements are lawful in intrastate transactions under a state's fair
trade act. Thus, it effectively ovenules the holding of the Dr. Miles case.
The Amendment also provides that the making of such contracts or agreements shall not constitute an unfair method of competition under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 36 The Amendment is thus a federal
enabling statute, which purportedly gives neither federal approval nor
disapproval of fair trade, but rather leaves it to the discretion of the individual states to enact fair trade acts or to refrain from enacting them.37
29. Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 269 N.Y. 272, 199 N.E. 409 (1936).
30. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
31. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-%, §§188-91 (Smith-Hurd 1960).
32. Miller-Tydings Amend., 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970) (this amendment laid the foundation
for nationwide use of resale price maintenance in interstate commerce).
33. For an account of the legislative history of the Miller-Tydings Amendment see
Pepsodent Co.-v. Krauss Co., 56 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. La. 1944).
34. See G. WILcox, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINEss 710 (3d ed. 1966).
35. No law, state or federal, directly permits horizontal price-fixing agreements between
competitors on the same functional level. But see text accompanying notes 173-174, 199-207
infra.
36. Fed. Trade Comm'n Act ch. 311, §5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.

§45 (1970).
37. Federal control was thus abdicated to what proponents of the Amendment styled
as the sovereign will of the states. See Hearings on S. 3822 Before Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1936) (testimony of NARD spokesman,
Edward S. Rogers).
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However, its net effect is to give legal sanction to that which was previously
in violation of the Sherman Act; it, therefore, impliedly approves fair trade
laws.3S
Despite the mere "enabling-act" status of the Miller-Tydings Amendment,
the states interpreted it, in conjunction with Old Dearborn, as an expression
of complete federal approval of fair trade; within one year of its passage
twenty-eight states, including Florida, had adopted fair trade statutes 39
and by 1941, forty-five jurisdictions had fair trade laws. 4 0
The fair trade laws adopted by these states generally exempted certain
specified resale price maintenance contracts or agreements from common
law antitrust prohibitions. For the next fifteen years the fair trade laws
were to enjoy their greatest period of popularity. However, in 1951 the
Supreme Court again struck a blow against resale price maintenance in
Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.41 by declaring the "nonsigners clause" violated the Sherman Act in being an unlawful restraint of
trade, and that the clause was not within the protection of the MillerTydings Amendment. 42 Proponent retailers and manufacturers, realizing
that fair trade laws without "nonsigner clauses" were considerably less
effective, responded to Schwegmann with immediate pressure on Congress
for additional exemptive status. Support for the subsequent McGuire Act4 3
came principally from organized groups of distributors and retailers. 4 4
In fact, the fair trade program was characterized "as the small shop-keeper's
minimum wage law,"' 45 and a "retailer's show with a manufacturer's sign
or label over it."' 6 Significantly, the proposed McGuire Act was vigorously
opposed by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 4 7

38. See Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 56 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. La. 1944).
39. Consideration of the new fair trade laws by the state legislatures was so superficial
that gross stenographic errors were overlooked by seventeen states that adopted NARD's
proposed fair trade law. Celler Comm. Hearings 436.
40. Alaska, Missouri, Texas, Vermont, and the District of Columbia never adopted fair
trade laws. For a current listing of the states with fair trade acts, the type and provisions
of their acts, and a listing of their constitutional status see 2 CCH TPADE REG. REP. §§6017,
6041, 6047 (1971). See also FLA. STAT. ch. 541 (1969).
41. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
42. Fair trade laws were also undermined by Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 185 F.2d 903,
aff'd on rehearing, 192 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1951). The court held the Pennsylvania fair trade act
could not be used to force a Pennsylvania mail-order house to adhere to minimum resale
prices when selling outside that state because it would constitute an unlawful restraint of
interstate commerce. However, the subsequent McGuire Act was to negate the effect of this
decision.
43. McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. §§45 (a) (2)- (5) (1970).
44. NARD was again a principal proponent of fair trade through its newly organized
Bureau of Education on Fair Trade. For other supporters see H.R. REP. No. 1292, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 22, 23, 38 (1952) [hereinafter cited as SMALL BUSIN.SS REPORT].
45. Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
on H.R. 5767, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Commerce Comm.
Hearings].
46. Celter Comm. Hearings 438.
47. Celler Comm. Hearings 75.
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as well as by labor, farmer, and consumer organizations; 48 many department
stores and mail order houses; and even independent retailers and manufacturers who found fair trade impracticable. 49 After extensive hearings on
the fair trade problems,50 Congress, in 1952, enacted the McGuire Act,
which exempted nonsigner clauses from Sherman Act coverage. 51 The
McGuire Act, like the Miller-Tydings Amendment, is merely a federal
enabling statute that purportedly does not represent federal approval or
disapproval of resale price maintenance. It is also similar to the MillerTydings Amendment in its express condemnation of all "horizontal price
fixing agreements." 52
The McGuire Act was held to be constitutional by the Fifth Circuit in
1953.r3 The Supreme Court decision in Hudson Distributors v. Eli Lilly
& Co. 5 4 would seem to provide reassurance to proponents of fair trade that,
absent congressional action, the competition-fostering Sherman Act will
not return to haunt future fair trade agreements.
While fair trade now appears to be safe from further judicial attack at
the federal level, its position is considerably less secure at the state level.
Since the 1950's a definite trend in the state courts has developed to invalidate the fair trade laws-particularly the nonsigner provisions-on state
constitutional grounds. Three states have held their fair trade acts to be
unconstitutional in toto.55 Courts in another twenty states, including Florida,
have struck down the nonsigner provisions as violating their state constitutions.56 But perhaps most important, in addition to the four states that
48. SMALL BUSINESS REPORT 23.
49. Celler Comm. Hearings 594.
50. For a discussion of the hearings leading up to the McGuire Act see Fulda, Resale
Price Maintenance, 21 U. Cam. L. Rav. 175 (1954).

51.

In addition to the points covered by the Miller-Tydings Amendment, the McGuire

Act accomplishes four results: (1) it overturns the rationale of the Schwegmann case and

specifically allows enforcement of resale price maintenance against nonsigners where permitted by state law; (2) it makes express provision for contracts that prescribe stipulated
as well as minimum prices; (3)it provides expressly for contracts requiring a vendee to
enter into another contract (with a subvendee), which prescribes minimum or stipulated

prices; (4) it negates the implications of Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.
1950), vacated, 341 U.S. 944, 192 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1951), by providing that neither the making
nor the enforcement of a resale price maintenance contract lawful under state law shall
constitute an unlawful burden or restraint upon, or interference with, interstate or foreign
commerce.
52. See note 35 supra.

53. Schwegmann Bros. v. Eli Lilly Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
856 (1953).
54. 377 U.S. 386 (1964).
55. The highest state courts of Alabama, Montana, and Utah have held their entire
act to be unconstitutional. See cases cited in 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. §6021, at 9039, 9049,
9054 (1971).

56. Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming have all had their fair trade
act's nonsigner clauses declared unconstitutional by their highest state court, except Idaho
whose district court handed down the ruling. Id. 6021, at 9039-56.
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never adopted fair trade laws, 57 six states in the past twelve years have
repealed their entire fair trade acts, 5 8 while two other states have repealed

their nonsigner clauses.5 9 This leaves a total of only fifteen states with full
fair trade acts6 -a significant decline from the high of forty-five. Generally,
state courts have invalidated all or part of their fair trade laws on the
grounds that the acts either exceed the police power of the state, deny due
process, unlawfully delegate legislative authority, or deny equal protection
of the laws.61 Rhode Island's recent repeal exemplifies a typical situation.
Its legislature seemed to rely primarily on the fact that fair trade results
in higher prices for the consumer and serves only a small fraction of the
manufacturers and retailers.62 Whatever the reasons, there is unquestionably a trend against fair trade.
HISTORY OF FLORIDA FAIR TRADE

The Fair Trade Acts of 1937 and 1939
Florida passed its first fair trade act in 193763 following the enactment
of the Miller-Tydings Amendment. But two years later the entire 1937 act
was held unconstitutional in Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut-Rate Drug
Co.64 because of a defect in its title. The Florida supreme court ruled that
the title"5 of the fair trade act did not give sufficient notice of the existence
of a "nonsigners clause" in the act, and therefore was misleading.66 Sig57. See note 40 supra. Although Congress has sanctioned the use of such laws for the
states through the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts, it is perhaps ironic that Congress
never enacted a fair trade law for the District of Columbia. Id. 6019, at 9036 (1971).
58. The entire state fair trade act was repealed by Hawaii (1967), Kansas (1963),
Mississippi (1970), Nebraska (1959), Nevada (1965), and Rhode Island (1970). Id. 6017,
at 9032.
59. Virginia (1958) and Ohio (1959) enacted new fair trade laws without the traditional
nonsigner clause. Id. f6017, at 9032.
60. Full fair trade acts still exist in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Id. 16021, at 9038-56.
61. For a complete list of cases and grounds on which state statutes have been held
unconstitutional see 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP,. f6021, at 9038-66 (1971).
62. Hackett, Repeal of Fair Trade Law Urged, Opposed, Providence (R.I.) Journal
March 30, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
63. Fla. Laws 1937, ch. 18395, at 1278.
64. 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91 (1939).
65. "An Act To Protect Trade-Mark Owners, Producers, Distributors and the General
Public Against Injurious and Uneconomic Practices in the Distribution of Competitive
Commodities Bearing a Distinguishing Trade-Mark, Brand or Name, Through the Use
of Voluntary Contracts Establishing Minimum Resale Prices and Providing For Refusal
To Sell Unless Such Minimum Resale Prices Are Observed." Fla. Laws 1937, ch. 18,395, at
1278 (emphasis added).
66. The lack of sufficient notice of a nonsigners clause in the title was in violation of
FLA. CONS-I. art. 3, §16 (1885), which provides in part: "[E]ach law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which sub"
ject shall be briefly expressed in the title ....
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nificantly, the title of the 1937 fair trade act was evidence that the legislature
viewed the protection of manufacturers' "goodwill" to be the primary
purpose of the act. It did not mention the protection of small retailers from
the "predatory competition" of larger retailers as being one of its purposes
(NARD's retailer protection theory). The Florida Fair Trade Act was subsequently amended to remove these objections of the original act and was
reenacted.67
The 1939 Florida Fair Trade Act was again held to be unconstitutional
in its entirety in Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp.68 Because Liquor Stores is the latest decision to hold the entire act unconstitutional and because it has never been overruled, it stands as substantial
precedent for any further consideration of the constitutionality of the present
fair trade act,6 9 which was enacted six weeks after the decision in the Liquor
Stores case.
The factual situation in Liquor Stores is similar to that in Bristol-Myers.
Continental Distilling Corporation, a liquor manufacturer, had sold certain
trademarked whiskies to a distributor under a "vertical trade agreement,"
which stated that the liquor was not to be resold to the public at less than
a minimum price to be set by Continental. Liquor Stores, Inc., retail liquor
dealers, purchased some of these whiskies from the distributor with notice
of the resale price agreement, but did not sign the agreement and therefore
was a nonsigner. Continental, thereafter, brought suit under the 1939 Florida
Fair Trade Act, specifically invoking the nonsigner provision to enjoin
Liquor Stores, Inc. from advertising and selling the whiskies bearing plaintiff's trademark at a price below the minimum set by plaintiff.70 Although
the Florida supreme court again might have limited itself to a consideration
of the validity of the nonsigner provisions alone, the court instead deemed
71
it appropriate to examine the entire act.
The supreme court first concluded that the fair trade act was not within
the scope of the state's police power because: (1) the act failed to demonstrate a general public purpose; rather it served a private purpose to the
detriment of the general welfare, 72 and (2) it failed to exhibit the requisite

67. The 1939 fair trade act simply omitted the phrase "through the use of voluntary
contracts" and stated that selling below the established prices was prohibited whether the
person selling was or was not a party to the contract. See Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19,201, at 407.
68. 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
69. See FLA. STAT. ch. 541 (1969).
70. The facts are set out in Justice Barns' concurring opinion. 40 So. 2d at 376-77.
71. The court observed that the fair trade act was: "[A] species of the relatively recent
national recovery legislation. It was conceived at a time when there were surpluses and
general need for such a law in certain basic commodities. The courts approving similar
acts scarcely had an opportunity to observe its effects other than as its proponents visualized
its operation in futero. We are in a more favored position as we have the benefit of the
actual consequences flowing from its application. Id. at 374 (emphasis added). Presumably,
it was for this reason that the court deemed it appropriate to examine the entire act, rather
than limit itself to the nonsigner clause.
72. The court refuted the contention that the statute was in the public interest or
concerned with the public's general welfare, when it noted that the actual effects of the
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"public necessity" to justify a private purpose.73 Second, the statute was
held to be unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, because it benefited a particular group or class-producers and distributors of trademarked,
branded, or named commodities-to the detriment of consumers, retailers,
and other manufacturers.7 4 Third, the act was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority to one person or class to be exercised against another.75 As a result, the act also violated due process of law in vesting this
price-fixing authority without any legal provisions to regulate the reasonableness of the prices fixed .7
The 1949 Fair Trade Act
Despite the Florida supreme court's suggestion that the circumstances
under which the fair trade act would be constitutional were virtually nonexistent, the statute was amended and reenacted six weeks after the Liquor

act had been to the detriment of consumers. Furthermore, could it be claimed to be for a
public purpose when by its inherent nature the act was designed to provide special
privileges and immunities only to a particular group or class of producers and distributors
of trademarked, branded, or named products? Since the act failed to meet the requisites
of public purpose and public interest, the court concluded the act was not within the
constitutional limits of the legislative police power. Id. at 375.
73. The court implied that although an act essentially served a private purpose, it
might have been upheld if it could be demonstrated that the act also served the general
welfare in meeting some public necessity. To meet this exception it was not sufficient that
the act merely show a public concern; rather, "there must be some semblance of public
necessity for the act." Id. Justice Barns argued, in a concurring opinion, that while the
fair trade act may have been a reasonable exercise of the police power during the depression
years because of the special economic circumstances that existed then, "[t]he present
[economic] conditions are now somewhat reversed" from those of the depression. Id. at 383
He concluded that the continued application of the fair trade act was no longer a reasonable
exercise of the state's police power because the public necessity for such a private purpose
law no longer existed. Id.
74. "The statute cannot be the means of leveling unequal fortunes, neither can it
favor one segment of the people at the expense of another." Id. at 374.
75. "Constitutional law never sanctions the granting of sovereign power to one group
of citizens to be exercised against another unless the general welfare is served." Id. The
court laid the foundation for yet a third basis on which the fair trade act was unconstitutional- it was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority because "[t]he effect of
this act [was] to grant by indirection sovereign power to one person (not necessarily a
citizen) to be exercised against another." Id. at 374-75. In substantiating this conclusion the
court asserted: "The power to fix the price is vested in an interested person who is not
an official. There is no review of his act. He is required to consult with no one and in no
sense is required to take into consideration the cost of the article or the reasonableness
thereof." Id. at 375.
76. The court asserted that the authority to fix prices can only be vested with a duly
constituted price-fixing agency, which must give due notice of its action. Moreover, the
"prices fixed must have some regard to reason besides having a public concern." Id. To
allow prices to be fixed otherwise, such as under the fair trade act, would constitute not
only an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, but would also be in violation of the
due process guarantee as well.
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Stores decision 77 Presumably, the new statute was designed to overcome the
constitutional objections and holding of the Liquor Stores decision. On its
face, such an objective must be accepted as a valid goal. However, the resultant product of this attempt raises doubts as to the legislature's success
in achieving this goal and as to its sincerity in attempting to meet it. The
new act suggests that rather than making a genuine effort to bring the fair
trade law within the constitutional limits outlined in Liquor Stores, the
legislature was content with merely making the law sound constitutional.
The first factor raising doubts is the manner in which the act was
amended. The amended act contains, in addition to its previous unaltered
provisions, a preambulary "findings of fact"' 8 and a provision permitting, not
requiring, the attorney general to bring suit to restrain the enforcement of
any resale price maintenance contract covering a product that is not found
to be in free and open competition with commodities of a like kind and
quality.7 9 These amendments do not effect any substantive changes but, in
essence, endeavor to justify the previous act. As subsequent legal and
economic analysis will emphasize, the amended act is substantially the same
law the Florida supreme court had ruled unconstitutional.

The only significant addition is the "findings of fact,"8 0 which purport
to establish the act's constitutionality by rebutting conclusions of the supreme court in Liquor Stores. However, their initial credibility is marred
by their history, which suggests that the findings were not the result of a
careful examination of all the relevant information that would have established the validity of fair trade and the constitutionality of the act. The
house bill was in committee for twelve days, the senate bill only three.81
There is no record of the actual time the committees spent considering
these bills, but the records show there was no discussion of the bills on the
floor of either house.8 2 It appears that the legislature gave little credence to
Justice Hobson's admonition: "It is the failure to first investigate and make
a determination of public necessity which causes such legislation to be
fraught with shocking possibilities. An act of this type must be subjected to
dose scrutiny with respect to its constitutionality. Its genesis must find
justification in, and its life depend upon, public necessity."8' 3 By comparison,
the federal legislature, when faced with the similar issue in considering
the McGuire Act, spent several weeks in hearing testimony on the pros
and cons of resale price maintenance,8 4 and its effects on the manufacturers,
retailers, and consumers. This comparison would suggest that the Florida
Legislature's examination of the pertinent material was cursory, at best.

77. The amended Florida fair trade act was signed into law by Governor Fuller Warren
on June 1, 1949. Fla. Laws 1949, ch.25,204, at 466.
78. FLA. STAT. §541.001 (1969).
79. FLA. STAT. §541.09 (1969).
80. FLA. STAT. §541.001 (1969).
81. See FLA. H. JouR. 446, 663 (1949); FLA. S. JouR. 313, 354 (1949).
82. FLA. H. JOUR. 446, 663 (1949); FLA. S. JouR. 313, 354 (1949).

83. 40 So. 2d at 386-87.
84. See Fulda, supra note 50.
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The question remains: Did the legislature succeed in overcoming the
constitutional objections of the former fair trade act? It will be seen that the
answer of the subsequent court decisions is wholly inconclusive. The nonsigner clause was later held unconstitutional by the Florida supreme
court,8 15 but the balance of the fair trade act has never been before the
court.8 6

Findings of Fact
The amended act's principal changes are the seven findings of fact.",
Several of the findings attempt to show that the act serves the public welfare and establishes a public purpose, and thus brings it within the requisites of the police power.8 8 Some of these findings simply declare that the
act serves the public welfare or is within the police power, 89 while others
state that large businesses' predatory pricing practices will destroy small
merchants and thereby lead to monopolistic market conditions.90
Can a law credibly be accepted to be within the police power just because
the legislature declares it to be? The Florida supreme court has indicated
that to be valid these findings must be based on economic realities. 91 Thus,
the validity of the 1949 act depends on the correctness of economic assumptions that monopolies will take over the retail markets in the absence of
fair trade, and that fair trade is an effective means of preventing such a
result. These assumptions will be considered in the economic section of
this article.
An additional finding asserts that "predatory price cutting is . . . also

injurious to the goodwill and business of the producer and the distribuThis has been commonly referred to as the "manufacturer's
tor .....'9
goodwill-protection theory" and was specifically rejected as a private purpose
by the supreme court in Liquor Stores. This finding then would not seem
to constitutionally justify the statute.
Another finding declares that public interest requires the "permissive
or optional maintenance of minimum resale price . . . at all times, includ-

ing periods of deflation or inflation."9 3 By declaring the statute to be
optional, the legislature seems to be rebutting the court's ruling that the
fair trade law is a price-fixing statute. This assertion, however, fails to
recognize that from the unwilling retailer's point of view the necessity of
accepting a fixed resale price or not selling that product at all may be an
economically unviable alternative. As a legal issue this finding, unless based

85.
86.

Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
See text accompanying notes 116-117 infra.

87.

FLA. STAT. §541.001 (1969).
FLA. STAT. §§541.001 (1)- (4),

88.
89.

(7).

Id. §§541.001 (1), (7).

90. Id. §§541.001(2), (3), (4).
91.

Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1951).

92. FLA.
93. FLA.

STAT.
STAT.

§541.001 (4) (1969).
§541.001 (6) (1969).
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on fact, could not overrule the judicial determination. 94 This finding dedares fair trade to be public policy during all phases of the economic business cycle.05 This would be contrary to the court's conclusion that fair
trade might be justified only in periods of severe economic crisis.96
The additional amendment to the 1939 Florida Fair Trade Act was a
provision9- permitting the attorney general to bring suit to restrain performance of any price-fixing contract when he deems the commodity covered
by the agreement not in free and open competition with other commodities
of the same general class. This was an apparent attempt to overcome the
supreme court's holding that the fair trade act was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority. The court's objections, however, were
that, in violation of due process, there were no guidelines that would insure that the prices fixed by the vertical trade agreement were reasonable.
This provision only purports to insure that horizontal collusion will not
be allowed. Moreover, it is not even mandatory that the attorney general
take any action, but rather the act "permits" him to request a restraining
order. At best, this provision provides a procedure for the enforcement of
the Florida antitrust laws. It hardly seems to remove the objections that the
fair trade law was an improper delegation of legislative authority and is in
violation of the due process clause.
In reviewing the over-all changes in the 1939 fair trade act, it becomes
apparent that the legislature's primary concern was in demonstrating that
the act was within the police power by endeavoring to establish the public
purpose or necessity for resale price maintenance. Actually, the only new
theory offered to substantiate the public purpose or necessity was the small
retailer protection-anti-monopoly theory. The economic validity of this
theory may be questioned.
Furthermore, none of the purported changes would correct the inherent
operational effects, which were found to be in violation of the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida
constitution.9s Because of the inherent nature of resale price maintenance,
it appears that nothing short of repealing the fair trade act would cure the
inequities it promotes. As a result it may be concluded that even if the
findings are accepted as validly justifying the act's public purpose, they
are insufficient to remove the remaining constitutional objections. Therefore, the present fair trade law is just as unconstitutional as the previous
act. 9

94. See note 91 supra.
95. FLA. STAT. §541.001 (6) (1969).
96. 40 So. 2d at 286 (Hobson, J., concurring).
97. FLA. STAT. §541.09 (1969).
98. FILA. CONSr. Decl. of Rights §§l, 12.
99. The present act, in short, is still violative of the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Florida constitution, even if it serves a public necessity and is a proper
delegation of the legislature's authority under the police power.
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Litigation of the Constitutionality of the 1949 Florida Fair Trade Act
This issue of the 1949 fair trade act's constitutionality first reached the
Florida supreme court in Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc.100
Ben Greene involved a nonsigner, as did Bristol-Myers"1 ' and Liquor
02
But contrary to these earlier decisions the Ben-Greene court found
Stores.1
this fact to be a distinguishing element and the controlling factor in the
decision.
Initially, the court noted that the 1949 fair trade act, under which the
action was brought, was distinguishable from the previous fair trade act
ruled unconstitutional in Liquor Stores. The court distinguished the acts
by the addition of "the findings or recitations of fact and declaration of
necessity as to the State's economic policy made by the legislature"' 03 to
the 1949 act.
0
The court, commenting on these findings of fact, stated:1 4
The general rule is that findings of fact made by the legislature are
presumptively correct. However, it is well recognized that the findings
of fact made by the legislature must actually be findings of fact. They
are not entitled to the presumption of correctness if they are nothing
more than recitations amounting only to conclusions and they are
always subject to judicial inquiry. Moreover, findings of fact made
by the legislature do not carry with them a presumption of correctness
if they are obviously contrary to proven and firmly established truths
of which courts may take judicial notice. If the subject upon which the
legislature makes finding of fact is one which is fairly debatable, the
presumption of correctness attaches and remains extant until and
unless such findings are challenged and disproved in an appropriate
proceeding ....

After making these observations on the circumstances under which the
findings would be accepted as valid, the court noted that the chancellor in
the initial proceeding had held the 1949 fair trade act unconstitutional.
Writing for the court Justice Hobson held, however, that the issue of
whether the findings were invalid in the absence of any pleading directly
challenging and proof refuting the legislature's findings of fact would be
reached "if it were not for the fact

. . .

that Ben Greene, Inc., was a

'nonsigner' and except for the recent opinion of the United States Supreme
. . . Schwegmann Brothers ...... 105 The court was not clear,
Court in
though, in stating what grounds or authority they considered invoked by
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
there is
105.

54 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91 (1939).
40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949); see text accompanying notes 68-78 supra.
54 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
Id. at 236-37 (emphasis added). Except for the addition of these findings of fact,
no material difference between the 1939 and 1949 Acts.
Id.
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Schwegmann'0 as being controlling. The Schwegmann decision held that
the nonsigner clause was in violation- of the Sherman Antitrust Act because
it was not within the exemptive status of the Miller-Tydings Amendment.
Apparently the court was implying that the Florida Fair Trade Act's nonsigner provision was void as a violation of the Sherman Act. Arguably, the
supreme court need not have limited itself to consideration of the nonsigner
clause because the court had taken the entire act under examination in
both Bristol-Myers and Liquor Stores, even though only a nonsigner was
involved in both those cases.
The Ben Greene case is significant, nonetheless, in two important respects.
First, the court by implication ruled that the findings of fact, unless shown
to be false, were successful in removing all constitutional objections to the
former fair trade act. It must be contended that the court in so holding
receded from its strong position in Liquor Stores. Even assuming that the
findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of correctness, the court could
have held that the findings did not cure the constitutional objections of
the act's denial of due process and equal protection they had found in
Liquor Stores. Second, the supreme court made it clear that if the findings
appropriate proof a fact are successfully challenged and disproved in 10an
°
ceeding, the act will again be declared unconstitutional.
A challenge to the fair trade act's constitutionality again reached the
08
Florida supreme court in 1954 in Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd.
Since the court's decision in Ben Greene Congress had enacted the McGuire
Act,' 00 which specifically exempted nonsigner clauses from the Sherman Act.
The effect of Schwegmann was therefore negated.
Eckerd, a nonsigner, had challenged the constitutionality of the entire
fair trade act, but the supreme court again chose to limit its consideration
to the nonsigner clause because of Eckerd's nonsigner status. The court
first dismissed the assertion that the McGuire Act superceded its decision in
Liquor Stores and Ben Greene by noting the McGuire Act's status as an
enabling statute." 0 The supreme court then discussed the constitutional
validity of the nonsigner clause by stating:""
This Court has expressed its views on fair trade and similar acts and
has consistently and unequivocally rejected, on constitutional grounds,
both the underlying theory and the economic facts on which they are
sought to be predicated.
The court rejected the "goodwill" protection theory of the findings of
2 fact in declaring: 2

106.

341 U.S. 384 (1951); see text accompanying note 41 supra.

107. Id.
108. 73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
109. 15 U.S.C. §45 (a) (2)- (5); see text accompanying note 43 supra.
110. 73 So. 2d at 681 (Fla. 1954).

111. Id.
112.

Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
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[The real effect of the non-signer clause is anti-competitive price
fixing; not the protecting of the good will of trade marked products
as other courts have held. Good will, it has been said, should be determined by the price which the goods can command in a competitive
market, and not by the ability of the manufacturer to sell at a pegged
retail price which he himself selects.
The public necessity and due process protection of the fair trade act's
nonsigner clause was found to be absent when the court concluded:" 3
Except in times of economic emergency such inflexible price arrangements which the act sanctions are not in line with our traditional concepts of free competition, which have traditionally been the "yard-stick"
for protection of the consuming public. The real vice of the non-signer
clause is the absence of that standard, and the decisions of this Court
cited herein so hold. In removing the said standard the non-signer
clause must fall as an invalid use of the police power for a private,
not a public purpose.
Relying on the dicta of Ben Greene, Justice Hobson declared that the
actual findings of fact were not entitled to a presumption of correctness
because they were contrary to proved and firmly established truths of which
courts could take judicial notice.1 4 These conclusions rejecting the validity
of the findings of fact would appear to restore the entire fair trade act to
its unconstitutional status.
While the court limited its objections to the nonsigner provision, it is
apparent from the court's reasoning that if a "signer" had been before it,
the court would have declared the entire act unconstitutional. This in-

113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. "Legislative 'findings of fact' as to the policy behind the law, does not remove
the lack of the 'yardstick' standard, neither does the delegation of the power to the
attorney general provide such administrative supervision in the public interest as will overcome the innate vice in the act." Id. (emphasis added). This language would seem to
indicate that the supreme court found the findings of fact insufficient to overcome the
constitutional objections to the fair trade act raised in the Liquor Stores case. This inference is further evidenced by Justice Hobson's specially concurring opinion in which he
declared: "[T]he only finding of fact which would have been, but was not, made by the
legislature which could ever be said to sustain the validity of the 1019 Act . . . would
have been a finding that at the time of the passage . . . the economic structure of this
state was seriously endangered and that 'extremities requiring it [the fair trade law]
exist[ed] as a matter of fact.' Such a finding, had it been made b) our legislature in
1949 or in 1953, would obviously have been contrary to the self-evident fact that this state
and its people were enjoying unprecedented prosperity and the economic structure of this
sovereign state was as sound as it has ever been at any stage of its history. A finding of
fact to the contrary had it been made could not be said to be fairly'. debatable for our
courts may and should take judicial notice of a matter of common knowledge, to-wit:
that exigencies which might require such legislation in the interest of the summum bonum
-the greatest good for the greatest number-did not exist either in 1949 or 1953" (emphasis added). Id. at 683.
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ference can be made from the constitutional objections raised which by their
nature were not limited to the nonsigner clause but were objections to the
entire act and its effects. If the nonsigner clause, for instance, had been
declared invalid only for lack of consent by the nonsigner to the fixed
prices, then it might not be contended that the court found the entire act
to be unconstitutional. The court, however, did not limit its objections to
such narrow grounds but instead referred to defects that had been discussed in Liquor Stores, such as a lack of administrative supervision and
lack of public necessity."11
After the Eckerd case in 1954 no constitutional challenge of the Florida
Fair Trade Act has reached the Florida supreme court. For reasons not at all
apparent the supreme court in 1954 rejected an opportunity to consider the
entire act by denying certiorari to a case that involved a "signer."' "1 6
Both state and federal courts in subsequent cases interpreted this
denial of certiorari as a ruling on the merits and, therefore, considered the
Florida fair trade act to be constitutional. 1 7 However, the inconsistency of
the lower court cases has been indicative of the uncertainty that remainsan uncertainty that the supreme court should confront in the near future.

ECONOMICS

OF FAIR TRADE AND THE FINDINGS OF FACT

The examination of the legal changes and litigation of the 1949 Florida
Fair Trade Act has revealed that the present act's constitutionality is primarily dependent on the economic validity of the findings of fact.11 8 Since the
findings center primarily on the small retailer protection theory, it is appropriate to begin with an examination of this theory and then proceed
to the manufacturer's arguments.
Although the principal advocates of fair trade have been retailers and

115. This point is further emphasized by Justice Drew's specially concurring opinion,
which stated: "Since the Legislature made its findings in 1949 in Chapter 25204, Florida
in general and its merchants in particular have enjoyed economic success to a degree without parallel in its history. This is monumental evidence sustaining the conclusions of this
Court that the emergencies alluded to there [in the findings of fact] were not real but
fanciful and that, in the guise of public necessity the police power of this sovereign State
had been invoked for purely private purposes." Id. (emphasis added).

116. Chase & Sherman v. Sunbeam Corp., 73 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1954). Certiorari was denied
by the Florida supreme court during the same term it heard the Eckerd case. In the Chase
& Sherman case, which involved a "signer," the Dade County Circuit court upheld the
constitutionality of the fair trade act. In view of the apparent significance of this case and
the Florida supreme court's attitude toward the fair trade act, it is difficult to understand
why the court denied certiorari. However, a plausible reason for refusing to hear the
appeal was that the court already had before it the Miles case and Sterling Drug, Inc. v.

Eckerd, 71 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1954), which was heard the same day. In each case the nonsigner clause was held to be invalid. Erroneously, the supreme court believed these cases
would dispose of all the issues involved.
117. For a complete discussion of the subsequent court interpretations of the supreme
court's denial of certiorari in Chase & Sherman, see Heckerling, Florida Fair Trade ActThree Strikes and You're Out: Or Are You?, 25 U. MiAmi L. R1v. 227 (1971).

118. See text accompanying notes 100-117 supra.
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manufacturers, it is significant to note that support has by no means been
unanimous. In fact, the small percentage of commodities that are fair traded,
estimated at less than four per cent, 119 and the number of manufacturers
who use fair trade, significantly less than one per cent of all producers, 20
would seem to indicate that manufacturers have not found fair trade to be
everything it is purported to be. As a result, the subsequent arguments referred to as those of proponents should not be taken as representing the
position of all, or even of a large percentage of retailers and manufacturers.
Fair Trade and the Retailer
As noted previously, resale price maintenance was originally promoted
by manufacturers and producers following Dr. Miles as a means of protecting the goodwill of their brand names, with retailers and distributors
picking up the banner for fair trade with the advent of the depression
of the 1930's. 121 The small, independent retailer's concern then, as now,
has been the threat posed to the traditional structure of retail marketing
by the ever-increasing number of discount stores, department stores, and
other large retailers, even though the proponents of fair trade claim that
small retailers do not need protection from normal price competition, but
122
only from the "unfair," "deceptive," or "predatory" price competition.
The Loss-Leader as a Form of Predatory Competition. The principal
form of "unfair" or "predatory" price competition, which fair trade is said
to prevent, is the practice of loss-leader pricing. Loss-leader selling generally
refers to the practice of selling of a well-known, branded product at a price
substantially below its "normal price" in order to attract bargain-conscious
consumers. While the fact findings do not specifically refer to loss-leader
pricing, it is presumed that it is essentially this practice to which they refer
' 2
when they speak of "predatory cuttings of established prices.' 1 3
119. Herman, A Statistical Note on Fair Trade, 4 ANTrTRUST BULL. 583 (1959). Even at
the height of fair trade's popularity in 1959 it is estimated that no more than 10% of
all retail sales were of fair trade items. Id. at 587. In view of the increased number of
adverse decisions and legislative repeals of fair trade laws since that time, it is likely that

the number of retail goods fair traded is less than 1%.
120. Id. at 584.
121. See text accompanying notes 17-31 supra; Celler Comm. Hearings 369; N. STAGEY &
A. WILSON, THE PATTERN OF DISTRIaUTION 128 (1965).
122. Commerce Comm. Hearings at 27.
123. FLA. STAT. §541.001 (3) (1969). However, the meaning of the term "established
prices," is not clear. It might refer to any one of the following: (1) selling the specific
product in question at less than the customary markup in the trade; (2) selling at less
than the seller's markup on other goods; (3) selling at less than invoice cost plus distribution cost; or (4) simply selling at less than invoice cost. If the legislature uses "established prices" in either of the first two ways, its criticism would seem hard to justify, since
there is no reason why all dealers should use the same markup on a certain product or
why any dealer should apply the same markup to all his goods. To hold otherwise would
seem a violation of the basic capitalistic tenets of freedom of choice and enterprise. In
addition, if "established price" means invoice cost plus distribution cost, the term becomes
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Why should this practice be objectionable? Loss-leader selling is essentially a simple form of sales promotion. If a dealer wishes to increase his sales
he may either spend his promotional money on advertising or on selling
something for less than it costs. In the first case the consumer would receive
some sort of magazine, radio, or television advertisement. Whereas, in the
124
latter case the consumer would receive a product at a lower price.
Nonetheless, the objection to the latter practice as stated in the "findings"
by the assertion that "predatory cutting of established prices . . . [is] a deceptive means of unfairly luring from competitive merchants their customers,
and for other purposes, has been the most potent weapon to which the great
and destructive trusts have resorted most frequently, thereby to weaken and
destroy their smaller competitors financially unable to endure resultant
losses." 25
The loss-leader is said to be "unfair" because it is used as a decoy to
lure customers into the stores of unscrupulous retailers. 126 It is claimed that
the unprincipled retailer may not intend to sell the price-cut item at all,
but rather hide it, "run-out early," and then switch the customer to something "just as good."' 27 However, even if the retailer does not resort to such
original deceptions the contention is that the customers are further deceived by the false impression that comparable savings are to be obtained
on the other products of the unprincipled retailer. Arguably, the consumer
operating under such a false impression is misled into making purchases of
additional items on which the retailer realizes a substantial profit. As a
result the consumer does not save at all, but ends up paying a higher total
net price. The findings assert that the logical results of these continued
practices will be the destruction of small retailers and the evolution of
2s
"virtual monopolies."'
This reasoning suffers from several inconsistencies and fallacious premises.
First, the findings imply that loss-leaders of predatory price-cutting practices
are the exclusive tool of "great and destructive trusts." . 29 There is nothing
in the nature of loss-leader that would prevent the small retailers from
utilizing its "customer-attracting" advantages. Certainly, it would not entail

imprecise because of the subjective judgments involved in computing distribution costs.
However, if "established price" means invoice cost, the meaning becomes somewhat more
precise, although there are differences in wholesale prices due to such factors as quantity
purchased or geographic area of purchase and sale.
124. To the extent that selling below invoice or actual cost can be shown to be detrimental to the general welfare, a law prohibiting such below cost sales might be more
appropriate rather than a fair trade law, which gives the manufacturer a license to set
the resale price at whatever level he wishes. A limited number of states have such laws.
E.g., CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE §17044 (West Ann.); IDAHO CODE ANN. ch. 48-404 (1948).
See also 2 CCH TRADE REG. REPS. ffl6571, 6601, 6621 (1971).
125. FLA. STAT. §541.001 (3) (1969) (emphasis added).
126. Commerce Comm. Hearings 26 (statement by the Bureau of Education on Fair
Trade).
127. Id.

128.

FA. STAT.

§541.001 (3) (1969).

129. Id.
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enduring the losses of the price-cut name-brand item because fair trade
proponents claim that the unprincipled retailer more than makes up for
these losses with the additional sales of his high markup items.
An even more immediate fallacy is the implication that the retail market
has been plagued by "great and destructive trusts." While the period since
the 1930's has seen the increase of discount stores, department stores, and
other large retail outlets it can hardly be claimed that any of these have
evolved into great and destructive trusts. To the extent that great and
destructive trusts have evolved at all, they have been limited almost entirely
to the manufacuring and production levels of the economy. 130 Even to the
extent that monopoly is a threat, the antitrust laws, when adequately en13 1
forced, are a more appropriate means of dealing with such problems.
In fact, the Federal Trade Commission Act, section 5, specifically deals
with deceptive pricing practices,"32 and the Sherman Act, section 2, deals
with conspiracies to monopolize.

1 33

The essential question is whether loss-leader selling is, in fact, deceptive
or unfair. The argument is that once the consumer is "lured" into the
unprincipled retailer's store he will make additional purchases of high
markup items and end up paying a higher total net price." 4 If the consumer,
however, is such an astute bargain hunter as to be attracted by the loss-leader
in the first place, it would seem that the consumer must be credited with
some knowledge of normal prices. This being the case it appears doubtful
that the consumer could be so easily misled into accepting cheap substitutes or additional high markup items."'

130. See S. OPPENHEIMI & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRusr LAWS, CASES AND COMMENTrS
210-314 (3d ed. 1968).
131. See text accompanying notes 173-182 infra.
132. 15 U.S.C. §45 (a) (5) (1970).
133. 15 U.S.C. §§l, 2 (1970), which deals with attempts and conspiracies to monopolize,
has been included within and expanded by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. §45 (a) (1) (1970), which condemns "[u]nfair methods of competition in
" See also FLA. STAT.
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce ....
ch. 542 (1969). For a discussion of the ability of these laws to handle such pricing policies
when coupled with an interest to monopolize, see United States v. New York Great Ad. &
Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946), afJ'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949). See also
FLA. STAT. §541.001 (3) (1969).
134. Commerce Comm. Hearings 26.
135. Id. The rather dramatic and unconvincing answer of a NARD spokesman was:
"A druggist cannot take higher markup on dresses or yard goods when he is forced to
sell national brands of drug products below cost in a price war," [and] [that] . . . most
book shops do not sell millinery." The fallacious implications of such an answer are: (1)
that drug stores are in competition with stores that sell high-markup millinery; (2) that
millinery is the only product subject to high markups. Such a claim is particularly preposterous from a representative of the retail drug industry, an industry with one of the highest
average markup rates of all retail stores. The retail druggist has more than his share of alternative high markup items to compensate for his low profit items. The average margin on
drug proprietaries is about 33% as compared to 16% on food products. Celler Comm.
Hearings 396. Profit margins for retail druggists on some products range as high as 300
to 1000%. For example: aspirin, 340%; prophylactics 450%, and; phenobarbituates, 1000%.
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Of further doubt is the question of whether the discounter or other
unscrupulous retailer must sell the non-loss-leader items at exorbitant markups to make up for his losses on the loss-leader. A basic economic principle
is that when a seller increases his volume of sales, a lower average cost per
sale will normally result. 136 Therefore, if a discounter is also able to increase
the sales volume on his non-loss-leader items he will be able to increase his
total profits without increasing his over-all price. Perhaps he may even cut
his prices slightly.
In examining the proponents' arguments it becomes difficult to see the
inherently deceptive nature of loss-leaders. 137 Since fair trade laws make no
distinction between predatory price competition and normal price competition, but rather uniformly eliminate all retailer-level price competition,
it would seem that a more accurate characterization of the retailers' motives
would be the elimination of profit-trimming competition in general. 13
Price Cutting, Price Wars, and Fair Trade. In addition to preventing
the evils of loss-leader pricing, fair trade is said to be necessary to prevent
price wars and price cutting that result in the destruction of the small
retailer. One of the fair trade advocates' favorite examples of the purported
seriousness of this problem in the absence of fair trade has been the price
war,139 which followed the 1951 Schwegmann decision. 4 9 The price war,
which lasted only two or three weeks, was centered primarily in New York
City and several other metropolitan areas. 141 The time proximity of the
price war to the Schwegmann decision has been offered by fair trade advocates as evidence that price cutting and price wars are inevitable in the
absence of resale price maintenance. This evidence coupled with the assertion
that price cutting and price wars tend to destroy the small, independent
retailer played an important role in the congressional hearings in 1952,
which preceded passage of the McGuire Act. 42
The facts surrounding this price war raise substantial doubts about both
the purported evidence and the validity of the assertion it is said to support.
Three conditions set the stage for the 1951 price war. First, retailers had
accumulated abnormally large stocks of inventories. Second, retail sales of

Hearings on H.R. 10527 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,

85th Cong. 2d Sess. 676 (1958).
136. P. SAMUELSON, ECoNomxcs 441-46 (8th ed. 1970).
137. After all, loss-leaders are essentially a form of sales promotion like advertising.
Interestingly, for all the fair traders' zeal in fighting the purported deceptiveness of
loss-leaders and price-cutting, they have not ventured to attack deceptive advertising or
support legislation that would curb its well-known abuses. C. Wmcox, PuBLIc PoLICIES
TOWARD BUSINESS 386 (rev. ed. 1960).
138.
139.

Comment, Fair Trade; The Idea and Reality, 27 OHio ST. L.J. 144, 172 (1966).
Celler Comm. Hearings257-58, 575.

140. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 841 U.S. 884 (1951). Schwegmann disclosed that "nonsigner's clauses" were in violation of the Sherman Act.
141. Frankel, Price Maintenance, Price Wars, and the Distributor, 15 CtnuMrr EcoN.
CoMMENT 16, 18 (1953).

142.

Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance,21 U. Cu. L. Rrv. 175, 177, 178, 196 (1954).
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both consumer durable and nondurable goods had been on the decline
during the first and second quarters of 1951. Third, there had been widespread price cutting while fair trade was still in full force. Economic analysis
suggests that the price war was the result of these three factors and not the
Schwegmann decision.143

143. The existence of abnormally large inventories in the hands of retailers has always
been a condition that lends itself to price cutting. It is simply a case of supply exceeding
demand, which leads to undesired surpluses. The most expedient way to reduce such surpluses or swollen inventories has always been to reduce prices so as to increase consumer
demand. Adams, The Schwegmann Cases: An Economic Comment, 15 U. DETRorr L.J. 15, 16
(1951). The Commerce Department's seasonally adjusted figures for January 1951 showed
retail inventories to be almost 25% above those of 1950. The inventories continued to
increase through February and March, and by the end of April had climbed by an additional 9%. Inventories of durable goods showed an even greater increase with January
1951 figures 40% above the previous year. Stocks climbed an additional 11% by April. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, S-9 (March, June 1951). A considerable
portion of the subsequent price cutting must be attributed to these excessively large inventories. The fact that retail sales were declining during this same time period also accounts
for the decrease in prices. Retail sales of nondurable goods fell from a seasonally-adjusted
annual rate of $113.1 billion in the first quarter of 1951 to $111.6 billion in the second
quarter; and durable goods sales fell from $31.2 billion to $26.5 billion, a decline of over
15%. Frankel, supra note 144, at 19. Such declines in retail sales reflect a decrease in consumer demand, which causes further increases in the gap between the excess of supply over
demand. Again, the natural competitive response is that of reducing prices so as to attract
the diminishing number of consumer dollars. The third and perhaps most important factor
is that price cutting had been common and frequent long before the Schwegmann decision.
One of the main sources of such activity had been the discount houses. This everyday price
cutting by the discount houses is, of course, what the small retailers hoped to eliminate.
However, the fair trade laws were powerless then as now to prevent a large percentage of
this price cutting because 95% to 99% of the manufacturers refused to apply resale price
maintenance. It is the effects of the use of fair trade by the other 1% with which we are
here concerned. Their normal, everyday prices were 15% to 30% off the list prices, including
fair traded goods. The consumer was obviously interested in these lower prices, as the
popularity of discount houses was increasing rapidly. Don't Discount the Discount House,
RETAILING DAILY, Dec. 7-10, 1948. Co-ops, "buying clubs," and similar organizations also
offered merchandise at discount prices. In addition, small, independent retailers frequently
engaged in price-cutting, although their activities were less conspicuous and seldom brought
to public notice because of their size and dispersion. The importance of this widespread
price cutting lies, of course, in the fact that it controverts the contention that the pricecutting that followed the Schwegmann decision was a sudden and atypical phenomenon not to
be found when fair trade laws are in full force. In fact, the effect of Schwegmann was to
increase the number of stores that participated in price reductions on fair trade products.
This was especially true of the large metropolitan area department stores that formerly had
adhered to the resale prices because of their conspicuous size and concomitant susceptibility
to fair trade enforcement. With fair trade effectively restricted, Schwegmann served as a
psychological catalyst for what appears to have been an imminent trend. This is actually
a very basic theory of the cause of economic events. When the public expected price-cutting
to occur in the absence of fair trade, it actually served to promote its occurrence through
such expectations. A similar phenomenon has been seen recently in the case of "demand-pull
inflation." Consumers who buy more today than they ordinarily would because they expect
prices to be higher tomorrow, are increasing the excess aggregate demand and thereby
serving to further increase inflationary pressures through their expectations of higher prices.
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Despite the attention given to the price war by fair trade advocates and
the predictions that this was the beginning of the end for small retailers,
there is no recorded evidence of the price war having forced a single firm
into or appreciably nearer to bankruptcy. In fact, the magazine Drug Topics
reported that drug store sales in 1951 had climbed to the record shattering
total of nearly $4 trillion and that there had been a steady increase in
sales from June through December 4 4 in the period following the Schwegmann
decision. This expansion was not limited to the drug industry, 1 45 despite
the fact that legislation restoring effective fair trade was not enacted for
almost a year. These facts would seem to considerably undermine the dramatic allegations that without fair trade laws "insatiable greed .. .threatens
146
. ..to eliminate the small entrepreneur."'
While the fact that price cutting was already widespread prior to the
Schwegmann decision casts substantial doubt on the basic premise that fair
trade prevents price cutting, it should not be concluded that fair trade has
nothing to do with price cutting and price wars. Rather, it illustrates that
contrary to the traditional assertions, resale price maintenance is a principal
cause of price cutting. This conclusion is supported by several additional
7
factors.14
First, when products are sold at a fixed price under fair trade, the consumer will become conditioned to a product-price relationship. That is, the
consumer will come to expect that he can obtain the fair trade product at
a specific fixed price regardless of the type of retail outlet patronized, the
extra services received, or the area in which purchased. As a result of this
product-price conditioning, the consumer will be able to immediately recognize a price cut and therefore will be especially responsive to it.148
The fact that the majority of fair-traded products are standardized 149
The large retailers in the urban centers were already involved in a very competitive situation,
but under the increased public attention, they each apparently felt constrained to demonstrate that they had the lowest prices on fair trade goods. The fact that the most conspicuous price reductions occurred on previously fair traded items has been frequently referred
to as illustrative of proponents' contentions. However, subsequent analysis will demonstrate
that this fact actually substantiates opposite conclusions.
144.

Celler Comm. Hearings 143-44.

145. Testimony was also given as to increased sales by retail jewelers in Baltimore in
November 1951 as compared to pre-Schwegmann sales in November 1950. Id. at 250.
146. Id. at 111-12 (statement by Nat'l Ass'n of Tobacco Distributors, Inc.).
147. Frankel, supra note 141, at 20-21.
148. The terms "price cut" and "price cutting" are meaningful only to the extent
that there exists some "established price" against which the price reduction can be measured.
An established price, of course, is less likely to develop in the absence of fair trade because
of factors that operate in the normal competitive market to determine price. Thus, it becomes all the more curious that the findings refer to "predatory price cutting of established
prices," when they are not as likely to exist in the first place in the normal competitive
market.
149. "Standardized" in this context means that the specific product of a particular
manufacturer will be uniform in specifications and quality. For example, all cans of Right
Guard spray deodorant will have essentially the same chemical composition, even though
the product is "differentiated" from other spray deodorants through both advertising and
intrinsic qualities. Product standardization is to be distinguished from the situation in
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serves to compound their vulnerability to price cutting. That is, it becomes
a matter of indifference to the consumer which retailer he purchases from,
since he knows that the product will be the same wherever he purchases it.
National and regional advertising by the manufacturer further reduces the
necessity of selling and promotional activities by the retailer because the
consumer will have already obtained an idea about what he wants before
he goes to the retailer. The retailer's role, being reduced by these two
factors, increases the consumer's indifference with whom he patronizes. As
a result, price differences become more important to the consumer-pressure
is imposed on retailers to cut fair trade prices.
A third factor that greatly increases the likelihood of price cutting
under fair trade is the level at which prices are set. Manufacturers have a
tendency to fix fair trade prices at levels above the normal competitive price
to encourage the retailer to push their products rather than similar products
that do not yield comparable profits. 150 However, simple economic principles
dictate that higher prices will normally reduce the demand,' 5 ' except in
unusual cases. 52 A retailer, therefore, may actually receive greater total
profits if he sells at a lower price because the increased volume more than
offsets the reduced gain per product.
In reviewing these three factors, the surprising thing is not that price
cutting occurred prior to the Schwegmann decision, but that it was not even
greater than it was during this period. This can, in part, be explained by
the fact that even at its peak only ten per cent of the consumer goods
were fair-traded.,5 3 Obviously, the majority of retailers and manufacturers
must have recognized that fair trade did not prevent price cutting, or we
could have expected that a much greater percentage of the products would
have been fair traded.
Price Cutting and Its Effects on Retailers. Thus, two principal assertions
have been found to be of highly dubious merit. First, that loss-leaders are
a deceptive practice. To the extent that they are used as a part of a larger
scheme to monopolize there are the antitrust laws to curb their abuse. Second,
it appears that fair trade, rather than preventing price competition, serves
to promote its utility and profitability. But what if fair trade did successfully
stop all price cutting? What would be the benefit provided to the small
retailer if general price competition were eliminated at the retail level by
fair trade?
which the products of all manufacturers are essentially the same. For example, salt or
sugar. Yet it should be noted that even producers of such industry-wide standardized
products will attempt to differentiate their products. For example, salt: "When it rains
it pours."
150. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 86, 90 n.5
(1960).
151. Id. at 90.
152. Certain products, luxury goods and status symbols, have artificial, price-induced
reputations. Demand for these goods, paradoxically, decreases as prices drop. These are the
only products that actually benefit from fair trade protection.
153. Herman, supra note 119, at 586.
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To answer this question the nature of competition itself must first be
examined briefly. Competition is deemed to be a desirable goal, for even
the findings state: "Prohibiting the unfair and discriminatory practice of
price cutting . . . will foster and encourage free and honest competition."'

54

Competitive selling is the state of economic affairs that exists when there
are numbers of independent retailers vying with one another to attract
the limited number of consumer dollars by offering the goods and services
demanded by the public at the lowest possible prices. The inherent advantage of price competition, economic efficiency, is promoted because each
retailer will endeavor to minimize his costs so as to maximize his profits.
This result is forced because the dispersion of economic power prevents
any one supplier from being able to set an arbitrarily high price that would
yield an unreasonably high profit. As a result, competition is the regulatory
force in the capitalistic economy. The minimum price that is forced by price
competition ensures maximum purchasing power for the consumer as well
as maximum efficiency in the production and distribution processes.
To the individual retailer, on the other hand, higher prices mean
greater average profit per unit sold, and the greater the volume the greater
the total profit. With the normal consumer demand curve, however, volume
will increase only when the price is lowered. For most products, at given
levels of consumer demand, therefore, profits will be maximized only when
price is minimized.
However, in the long run the higher prices of the less efficient retailer
will cause his sales volume to continually decline. Ultimately, if his competitors can charge substantially less because of their greater efficiency, the inefficient, high-priced retailer will be forced to improve his efficiency, take
lower profits, or go out of business. Competition, therefore, is only a threat
to the inefficient retailer.
However, it is an entirely different matter to say that inefficient retailers
fail because of competition than to state that small retailers are forced into
bankruptcies by loss-leading and price wars. Because so many variables
determine the success or failure of the retailer, it is indeed difficult to
differentiate and pinpoint the actual causes of losses and failures. Nonetheless, the congressional committee hearings, prior to passage of the McGuire
Act, were replete with extravagant claims and assertions as to the destructive
effects of loss-leading and price wars. Yet for all the mass of data presented,
the assertions remain largely unsubstantiated. 15
154. FLA. STAT. §541.001 (5) (1969).
155. Commerce Comm. Hearings 30, 116, 135-41, 170. The limited evidence presented,
typically, is such that it is difficult to determine whether the losses or failures were in fact
due to price-cutting and price wars, or other economic factors. In the majority of instances
the evidence indicates it was more likely that those factors that contribute to a retailers
inefficiency were the causes of the retailers difficulties. However, where losses did appear
attributable to price-cutting, the amounts were not substantial. Furthermore, there was no
evidence as to actual business failure due to price-cutting or price wars. The facts presented
do not establish that there was a problem of sufficient severity to warrant public intervention and justify the attempted elimination of all retailer level price competition through
fair trade legislation.
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For the small retailer to ever be seriously harmed, price cutting must:
(1) endure over long periods of time or recur frequently, (2) take place on
products forming a substantial percentage of the retailer's sales, and (3) persistently reach levels well below merchandising and operating costs. 156
Unless these requisites are met, nothing stops the small retailer from
meeting the prices of his larger rivals. Additionally, the retailer's experience
in the free trade states indicates that these requisites are rarely, if ever, met.
For one thing, price wars are characterized by their brevity of duration, not
their endurance. Furthermore, unless the price war is generating extra
volume on the non-price cut items, the large retailers will find the price
was no more profitable than the small retailers. While small retailers may
find price cutting unpleasant, they rarely will find it fatal. The exception,
of course, is the inefficient retailer who cannot meet the everyday low prices
of his more efficient competitors.
The fallacy to which fair trade advocates have succumbed is to associate
any and all competitive situations with destructive or unfair competition.
Yet it is only natural that the high cost, inefficient seller be eliminated from
the marketplace. The fair trade advocates have further erred in identifying
the competitive pressures from large retailers with the symptom of price
competition on nationally advertised brands. Loss-leading and price competition are not the cause of the small retailer's demise. His problems, instead,
arose because the techniques of production have changed tremendously
over the past forty years. The strength of the large retailing outlets lies not
in select predatory cutting of national brands as the findings would claim.
Rather, their advantage lies in improved, more sophisticated retailing practices, 157 including pricing policies that are more consonant with lower cost
merchandising techniques that meet the changing consumer needs, tastes,
and preferences. In a word, they have become more efficient.
This fallacy in identifying the true causes of the small retailer's demise
probably arose in part because large retail outlets began to develop during
the Depression, a time of severe and persistent price cutting.158 But while
price cutting was rampant during the 1930's, and many small and some
large retailers were forced to close, the cause of this severe price cutting was
due to a severe fall in aggregate demand and a resulting excess of product
supply over consumer demand at prevailing prices. 159 In such circumstances
the fall of prices is inevitable.
However, the emergence of large retailers was not entirely coincidental.
Economic circumstances, such as the Depression, put a premium on efficiency
and dictate the survival of the most efficient.
The Evolution of Retailer Monopolies. The conclusion that small retailers
are not any more susceptible to price competition and loss-leader practices,
in the absence of fair trade, is supported by several statistics. Contrary to
156.
157.
158.
159.

Frankel, supra note 141, at 23.
See text accompanying note 215 infra.
See note 17 supra.
Frankel, supra note 141, at 28.
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the dismal predictions by fair trade advocates that the small retailer would
soon perish in the absence of fair trade protection, it was found in 1948
that the free trade areas, those without fair trade laws, had forty-five drug
stores per million people, whereas the fair trade states had only thirty160
Actually, the number of retail drug stores
seven drug stores per million.
declined slightly in both the fair trade and free trade areas between 1935
and 1948. In both cases the decline was less than one per cent.'"' Such
uncomplicated statistics indicate that thirteen years without fair trade in
the free trade areas had failed to discernibly affect the vitality of drug
retailers in those areas.'6 2 That is, the predicted monopolization of the retail
markets was not proceeding any faster in the free trade areas than in those
states where retailers were protected by fair trade. A more accurate statement would be that the effect of unencumbered competition in eliminating
the inefficient retailers was no greater in free trade areas than where supposed small retailer protection was in effect. Furthermore, the alarmist predictions are no closer to validity today than they were in 1948.163
Recent figures from the 1970 Statistical Abstract of the United States
indicate that retail trade in the free trade states is thriving. In fact, between
1958 and 1967 the number of retail establishments in the free trade areas
increased by 5 per cent, while the number of retailers in the full fair trade
64
Also, between 1968 and 1969
states decreased by more than 2 per cent.
the number of commercial failures in the free trade states declined by 12

160. Celler Comm. Hearings 508.
161. Id.
162. Texas and Missouri ranked 6th and l1th, respectively, in population in 1950. Both
were among the ten states with the greatest number of drug stores and the highest volume
of drug store sales. Id. at 146-47, Similarly, in 1948 Texas and Missouri ranked 6th and l1th
in number of retail jewelry stores, while according to volume of annual sales of jewelry
stores Texas ranked 5th and Missouri again l1th. Id. at 236, 238-39. The average drug
store sales in the District of Columbia, also a free-trade area, were higher than the average
of any state, and Texas had the largest number of proprietary stores. Id. at 445.
163. There were, on the average, 272 drug and proprietary stores (these stores are no
longer listed separately as they were when the data was presented to the pre-Maguire Act
congressional hearings) per million persons in the United States in 1967. Texas and
Missouri (4th and 14th in population) maintained their rank in number of drug and
proprietary stores at 4th and l1th in 1967. The full-fair trade states, see note 60 supra,
had an average of only 253 drug and proprietary stores, while the original free trade states,
see note 40 supra, had an average of 299 drug and proprietary stores per million people.
Such statistics again verify that those areas that have done without fair trade for the past
80 years have not been subject to a monopolization of their retail markets. In fact, they still
enjoy a larger number of retail stores than the fair trade states. U.S. BUREAU oF THE CENSUS,
STATisriCAL ABsrmar OF THE UNITED STATES No. 1179, at 740-41 (1970).
164. U.S. BURAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 163, at 740-41. The free-trade areas for
which data was calculated included only those areas without fair trade in 1958: Vermont,
Missouri, Texas, Alaska, and the District of Columbia. The full-fair trade states included
the fifteen states with full-fair trade acts today, see note 60 supra, and Rhode Island and
Mississippi, which had full-fair trade acts in 1967 (only those states that had full fair
trade acts throughout the measured period were used). The statistics used the total number
of retail establishments in these areas during 1958 and 1967, not just those stores with
payrolls.
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per cent while in the full fair trade states commercial failures declined
only by 7 per cent. 165 Not only did the free trade areas experience an increase in the number of retail establishments rather than a monopolization
of their retail markets, but those states with the benefit of resale price
maintenance suffered declines in the number of retailers. Similarly, the
decrease in commercial failures was actually greater in the free trade states
than in the fair trade states.
Additionally, in considering the bankruptcies in all states. those of retailers worth less than 100,000 dollars decreased by 31 percent between 1955 and
1969, while bankruptcies of retailers worth 100,000 dollars or more increased by over 177 per cent. 166 It appears that it is the large retailer who
has been falling into an increasing number of bankruptcies, not the small
one; a result contrary to what the fair trade advocates had alarmingly
predicted. Furthermore, while per capita sales by all retail stores increased
over 27 per cent between 1964 and 1969, the percentage of these sales by
multi-unit organizations (chain stores) increased from 26.1 per cent to only
29.3 per cent. 167 The single unit retailer still accounts for over 70 per cent
of all retail sales in the United States. A fact that often seems to be overlooked is that the larger retailer need not grow at the expense of the small
retailer. As the population continues to grow the retail market expands.
Even though the multi-unit stores increased their percentage of total market,
the single unit retailer's total sales continued to increase, although at a lower
rate than the multi-unit stores.
The 1968 Dun and Bradstreet report on business failures also indicated
that retailers in all major lines of trade continued to have a dwindling
number of failures that reached a sixteen-year low in 1968.1 8 For a period
that also saw nine additional states reject fair trade all together, there is
cause to believe they did not err in repealing these laws. Of even greater
interest is the list of the underlying causes of the 9,636 business failures
in 1968. They include: neglect, fraud, lack of experience in the line, lack of
managerial experience, experience not well rounded in sales, finance and
purchasing incompetence, and natural disaster.16 9 Nowhere is there any
mention of failure due to predatory price cutting, the purported omnipotent killer of small retailers.
The statistics, thus, seem to verify the conclusions as to the fallacies of
the fair trade advocates' assertions. Monopolization has not been the trend
in either the free trade or fair trade states. Price cutting is not a phenomena
to be expected only in the absence of fair trade, and to the extent that it
exists it does not destroy the small retailer. Only his own inefficiencies can
do that.
165.
166.
5,158 to
from 181
167.

Id. at 484.
Id. at 485. Commercial failures of retailers worth less than $100,000 decreased from
3,570 per year, while bankruptcies of retailers valued $100,000 or more increased
to 500 per year.
Id. at 734.

168.

DUN&

169.

Id. at 12.

BRADsTREEr, THE FAILURE REcoRD THROUGH
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Even if the absolute number of retail establishments were decreasing,
which the statistics indicate is not the case, 70 there would probably be more
competition today than in an era of more small single retailers. This is due
to the increased mobility of today's consumer. Ironically, the consumer of
the 1930's who was effectively limited to patronizing the neighborhood
store was actually being subjected to a virtual monopoly that the findings
refer to so disparagingly. As a consequence of increased mobility, today's
shopper has a greater number of establishments within his effective radius
than ever before. These increased alternatives have actually increased competition since 1935, despite the slight decrease in the absolute number of
retailers per million persons.' 7'
Furthermore, the possibility of virtual monopolies replacing the current
retail market structure is not only a legal impossibility due to the antitrust
laws, but it is essentially impossible in a physical and practical sense because of the regulatory laws of competition272
Fair Trade as an Appropriate Remedy for Monopoly. The 1949 legislature, perhaps inadvertently, implicitly recognized the regulatory function
of competition and its ability to prevent monopolistic prices by asserting
the need to protect the small retailer-for what else would be the advantage
of having a large number of small retailers, rather than virtual monopolies,
if not to promote price competition and its inherent advantages. However,
by introducing fair trade the legislature has effectively limited the usefulness of having a large number of small retailers because fair trade eliminates
the small retailers' primary mechanism of competing-price competition.
Fair trade requires formerly competing retailers to maintain uniform prices
set by the manufacturers and, thereby, facilitates the creation of monopoly
power by allowing the retailers to act as a single marketing unit for the
fair trade product. Since the retail giant can still use many other merchandising techniques that are not available to the small retailer,173 the small
retailer, without his most powerful weapon-price competition-is placed in
a more vulnerable position under fair trade. Thus, fair trade serves to
promote that which it purports to ward against-monopoly power. In spite
of this fact, small retailers have not vanished in the fair trade states because
170. Although there was a slight decrease in the total number of retail establishments
in the United States between 1958 and 1963, there has been a steady increase since that
time. This change corresponds with business cycle fluctuations. It appears that the growing
number of establishments is responsible for business failures. See text accompanying notes
158-159 supra. See also U.S. BUREAU OF Thm CENSUS, supra note 163, at 740-41.
171. See text accompanying notes 160-162 supra.
172. First, because retailing, unlike perhaps manufacturing, requires less capital and
physical facilities, it is relatively easy for competitive merchants to enter the retail market.
Second, there are limits, both legal and physical, to the economies of scale that can accrue
to being large. Should a large retailer ever be able to establish a "virtual" monopoly in a
certain market, the easiest way to combat the possibility of his subsequently charging extortionist prices would be the entry of a new competitive merchant who could offer the
price competition. See generally P. SAMUELSON, EcoNoMics 22-25, 462 (8th ed. 1970).
173. See text accompanying notes 178-180 infra.
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less -than four percent of all commodities are fair traded. Thus, the small
retailer is still able to engage in price competition on the majority of his
products.
Nevertheless, fair trade proponents have contended that it neither
destroys competition nor deprives the consuming public of competition's
advantages. First, it is argued that fair trade only prevents predatory or
unfair price competition-not useful, healthy competition. As discovered,
however, there is substantial doubt whether any degree of deceptive competition among retailers is not already covered by antitrust laws. Furthermore,
fair trade fails to make any distinction between unfair and normal competition. Instead, it unformly eliminates all price competition at the retailer
level, "unfair" and "normal." Second, competition is said to be promoted
by the requirement that the products fair traded must be in free and open
competition with commodities of a like kind and quality. 174 Presumably,
this requirement is designed to insure that inter-brand competition among
the manufacturers is not stifled, even though intra-brand price competition
is eliminated. As proof of this assertion the Bureau of Education on Fair
Trade submitted lists of fair traded articles to the Commerce Committee
Hearings in 1952. These lists show wide variation in prices of many competing brands of silverware, soap, face powder, fountain pens, electric toasters, mixers, shavers, irons, and other commodities. For example, the list
indicates there were 14 brands of automatic electric toasters with fair trade
prices ranging from $9.75 to $24.50 and 56 brands of face powder with
prices from 9 cents to $1.20 per ounce. 1 75 While the Bureau obviously intended to show by these lists that price competition still existed, they
actually supported a contrary conclusion because the products cited were
highly differentiated and thus were not in price competition with each other.
The products were in monopolistic competition. That is, because of differences among the products, some real, some created artificially (as by advertising), consumers were willing, within limits, to pay more for one brand
than for another. 176 However, the courts have considered the statute's competition requirement to be satisfied by the existence of competing goods of
7
the same general class, regardless of the extent of product differentiation. 7
Thus, a consumer buying a fair trade product may be left with neither
retailer nor producer price competition to assure him that he is getting the
maximum purchasing power from his limited number of consumer dollars.
But to acknowledge lack of manufacturer-level competition is probably to
miss the more basic point-the consumer is entitled to competition among
retailers as well as manufacturers. The price paid for warehousing and
distributing the product should be subject to competitive pressures, just
as the price paid for producing the product is purportedly subject to pro174. This requisite is stated in the "findings of fact" no less than four times. FLA. STAT.
§§541.001(l), (2), (5), (7) (1969).
175. Commerce Comm. Hearings 22-23.
176. C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS 509-10 (4th ed. 1969).
177. Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 828 (1947). See also Eastman Kodak Co., 44 F.T.C. 14 (1947).
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ducer competition. To excuse the elimination of retailer competition by
asserting the continued presence of manufacturer competition is irrational.
This same conclusion was reached by the Federal Trade Commission in its
178
study of resale price maintenance over twenty-five years ago.
A further reason to doubt the ability of fair trade to protect the small
retailer and to stymie the purported evolution of monopolies is found in
the considerable, though unpublicized, support given fair trade by large
retailers. 70 One explanation may be that although price competition is
eliminated, a variety of modem merchandising techniques are available
to the large distributor. Some examples are: specialists for advertising and
display purposes, widespread and frequent advertising, credit facilities, repair services when necessary, ability to seek and purchase merchandise at the
cheapest source, quantity buying, stocking and promoting his own private
brands, and self-service and mail-order shopping 8 0 With these numerous
merchandising techniques it becomes unnecessary for the large distributor
to rely on loss-leader selling. Additionally, the large retailer may circumvent
the fixed resale price on expensive items, such as cameras, stereo equipment,
and appliances by offering overly generous trade-in allowances on exchanged
equipment. While such technique is also available to the small retailer, the
larger dealer with his greater volume will normally be better equipped to
handle sales of the used trade-ins. Moreover, there are many nationally
known, brand named products, which are not fair traded, that may be
reduced in price for promotional purposes. Thus, even conceding the inability to cut some fair trade prices, there would be little to prevent the
large distributor from using an aggressive merchandising policy.
In fact, rather than limiting his ability to compete, fair trade may
actually assist the large distributor. It gives the large retailer a standard
against which to push his private brands, just as resale price maintenance
gives the price cutter an established price against which to measure his
price cutting. The larger retailer can establish prices on fair trade products,
which will give his private brands an advantageous comparison without fear
of price competition from the fair traded products. The small retailers, unable to afford private labels of their own, are powerless if they abide by the
price minimums to meet this competition. As a result, fair trade serves to
handicap the small retailer by removing one of his most viable means of
competition-price competition.
In reviewing the above factors it becomes readily apparent that fair trade
is inappropriate to remedy the purported evolution of retail monopoly. Not
only does it eliminate retailer price competition, leaving the consuming
public with a dubious amount of producer-level price competition, but it
assists the large distributor while handicapping the small retailer. With
178.

FEDERAL TRADE

CoMMIssIoN,

RESALE PRaCE MAINTENANCE,

SUMMARY

AND

CON.

CLUSIONS LXIV (1945).
179. See Edwards, Memorandum for the Assistant Attorney General, Grounds for the
Repeal of Miller-Tydings Which Authorize Resale Contracts (1941), reprinted in Celler
Comm. Hearingsat 436.
180. Frankel, supra note 141, at 26-27.
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price competition virtually eliminated, emphasis shifts to nonprice competition, an area in which the large retailer tends to excel because of his
greater resources. Rather than preventing the growth of the large retailers,
fair trade serves to encourage their development.
Fair Trade and the Manufacturer
It will be recalled a basic economic maxim is that a retailer will maximize
output by minimizing retail prices because consumer demand normally
increases as prices decrease. Therefore, the immediate paradox is why manufacturers would ever wish to maintain artificially fixed resale prices. 181 A
certain number of manufacturers have supported fair trade in an effort
to stop what they consider to be detrimental price competition. The rationale
for this apparent inconsistency is twofold. The manufacturer is said to
suffer from price competition and price wars because: (1) price competition
impairs the product's image or "goodwill," and (2) it reduces the product's
per unit profitability and the retailers' resulting willingness to carry the
product.'8
Fair Trade as a Tool of the Monopolistically Competitive Producer.
First, it is significant that less than one per cent of the manufacturers use
fair trade and that number is even declining. 183 The reason is that producers in the competitive industries are unable to affect the market prices
of their products because each producer accounts for such a small portion
of the total market supply.
However, if a product is sufficiently unique in some economically relevant
respect from competing products and consumers have indicated a preference
for the product, the producer may find it possible to demand a higher
price than his competitors without reducing consumer demand. Such a
situation has been seen to exist in the monopolistically-competitive markets
where product differentiation enables certain producers to determine price
84
levels of their products.
It is only those manufacturers with a certain degree of monopoly control over their prices who will be able to utilize resale price maintenance.
The competitive producer will find it virtually useless. This practical requisite to a manufacturer's employment of fair trade is an ironic and disturbing fact in light of the fair trade act's purportedly anti-monopolistic goals.
Yet, statistical studies verify this hypothesis. A study done in 1954 indicated
that approximately sixty-three per cent of the fair trade sales, accounting
for only eleven per cent of the total number of manufacturers in the sample,
were made by the largest manufacturers.' 85 In addition, a substantial number

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See generally Telser, supra note 150.
Frankel, supra note 141, at 25.
Herman, supra note 119, at 584.
See text accompanying notes 176-177 supra.
This ability to effect price is further reinforced if a product characteristic known

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss4/3

32

Hudson: Constitutionality of the Florida Fair Trade Act and Continuing My

1972]

THE FLORIDA FAIR TRADE ACT

of small retailers submitting returns to a congressional committee reported
they considered fair trade an expensive luxury beyond their means and
available to only the very large producers who can afford the expensive
enforcement costs.186
Actually, the principal benefits of fair trade accrue to the large manufacturers because effective loss-leader selling requires use of well-known,
heavily advertised brands, and such price cutting has primarily been of
concern to the large, well-established manufacturers who produce these
brand-named products. As a result, it can be argued that because fair trade
is primarily protecting the reputation of the larger manufacturers' products
from the purported depredations of price competition, fair trade is serving
to consolidate the market position of the larger manufacturers at the expense
of the small producers who remain subject to normal price competition. 87
Fair Trade and Product Goodwill. The next question of issue is whether
the large manufacturer actually needs the protection that fair trade purportedly supplies. Will the reputation or image of his product really be destroyed
or depreciated by loss-leader selling as contended? Economic analysis suggests that it will not.
The manufacturers' contentions stem from the assertion that reduced
prices lead the consumer to believe the quality of the product has deteriorated and therefore cause him to reduce his purchases. s8 Consumer reliance on
price as an indicium of quality has been found, however, to be of primary
relevance only where the product is comparatively unknown and the consumer has no other basis of judging its merits. 89 A "brand-name" product,
on the other hand, need not rely on price as an indicium of quality, as the
product-quality relationship has already been established in the consumer's
mind by advertising or his use of the product, or both. Price is only one of
many indicia of quality. In addition, the consumer will have come to recognize the product-price relationship, which has evolved as the branded product's quality reputation developed. Since these two established relationships
are necessary prerequisites to the product's usefulness as a loss-leader, the
consumer will respond to a price cut on the branded product only because
it is recognized as being a quality product and a "good buy." Consequently,
it is inconsistent to assert that at the same time the consumer is considering
as "inelastic demand" exists. This means essentially that despite fluctuations in price, the
demand for the product remains relatively stable. For instance, if a person is sick and needs
a certain medication, he is likely to purchase the product regardless of whether the price
is two dollars or eight dollars. Conversely, should the price of the medication decrease
from $8 to $2 the person is not likely to purchase the product when he is healthy. In other
words, consumer demand is largely unaffected by price. Drugs and cosmetics are two of the
best examples of this economic situation. This serves to explain why 46% of the fair traded
items are drug store products. Herman, A Statistical Note on Fair Trade, 4 ANwrmusr BuLL.

583, 585
186.
187.
188.
189.

(1959).
Id. at 589. See also Telser, supra note 150, at 87.
Herman, supra note 185, at 591.
Frankel, supra note 141, at 25.
Id.
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his increased purchases a good buy his opinion of the product is depreciating. If the consumer's opinion of the product were actually depreciating
he would not be buying more of the product as a loss-leader. The manufacturers' contention underestimates the sophistication of today's consumer
and the rationality of his distributing retailers.
The above conclusion is subject to one possible exception-products with
"negative price elasticity." Products with this unique characteristic will generate an increase in consumer demand as their prices are increased.190 Luxury goods and status symbols are the most frequent candidates for this aberration of the normal price-demand maxim. Because of this direct pricedemand relationship a price cut may impair the exclusiveness or snob appeal
that such a product has attained by virtue of its high price.
Aside from the issue of whether such a limited class of products should
be afforded the special protection of a vertical price fixing agreement, there
is doubt as to whether a rational retailer would ever use such a product as
a loss-leader, realizing that a price cut would diminish its exclusiveness and
reduce, rather than increase, his number of sales. Such retailer action seems
highly unlikely, and consequently the laws of economic self-interest will
serve to protect the negative-price-elastic product from price cuts.
It becomes apparent that the manufacturer's protection of product
goodwill argument is without basis. The small manufacturer of the relatively
unknown product does not need price protection because his product lacks
the requisite characteristics necessary for successful use as a loss-leader.
Those branded products that are useful as loss-leaders will have established
quality reputations that are not subject to the price as an indicium of quality
syndrome. And the retailer's economic self-interest will also protect negativeprice-elastic products. Consequently, product goodwill is not a viable justification for fair trade.
Fair Trade and Retailer Goodwill. A manufacturer's second line of
reasoning supporting fair trade is: (1) price cutting renders relatively unprofitable margins for some retailers who become reluctant to stock the
product, reducing the producers' distribution outlets;191 and (2) where sales
volume at the retail level depends not only on retail prices but also on
retailer services related to the specific product, fair trade is necessary to
protect margins sufficient to insure these services are rendered.192 These arguments concerned with retail distribution are referred to as the "retailer
goodwill" argument to be distinguished from the "consumer or product
goodwill" argument just discussed.
Proponents of retailer goodwill argue for the protection of retailer
profits in order to preserve the maximum number of retail outlets for distribution. Fair trade, however, may actually be harmful to the manufacturers'
interests because the argument assumes, perhaps fallaciously, that the larger

190. See Comment, Fair Trade: The Ideal and Reality, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 144, 153 (1966).
191. Frankel, supra note 141, at 25.
192. Telser, supra note 150, at 89.
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the number of retail outlets the greater the total volume of sales, which
is the manufacturers' primary concern.
The rationale of the argument is: First, the retailer will have a tendency
to push those items that yield higher margins rather than those with low
margins. 193 Second, because price cutting lowers margins, retailers will not
push the affected product and may eventually drop the item altogether if
the price cuts are too great and too frequent. It is then asserted that the
logical result is reduced sales for the abused manufacturer. Therefore, fair
trade is necessary to protect profit margins from price cutting.
This argument, however, is not without conceptual weaknesses. Although
retailers may push high-margin products, low-margin items may push themselves, since the lower priced products will tend to have a greater sales
volume. If the product has normal or high elasticity of demand the increased
sales will more than offset the low margin and yield a higher profit. As a
result, the low-margin product may not only push itself, but a retailer realizing that his total profits on the product are higher may also tend to push
the low-margin product. The fallacy of the first rationale is that although
retailers who refuse or are unable to reduce prices (because of their higher
costs) may suffer a decrease in sales as they lose customers to the competing
stores, the manufacturer will benefit from over-all greater volume.194
Because of the lower price some of the present consumers will be willing
to buy more of the product than before, and still others who previously
could not afford the product at all will be able to buy the product. Fair
trade would have prevented this price competition that has resulted in an
increased sales volume. Thus, rather than protecting the manufacturer's
interest, fair trade would have worked to his detriment in preventing an
increase in sales volume.
The second part of the retailer goodwill theory is the service argument.
This aspect is relevant only to those products whose sales volume is said to
be directly related to the rendering of special services, such as pre-sale
demonstrations or special repaid services.' 05 If the margins are not fixed by
fair trade, proponents argue that some retailers would not provide the
services, cut prices and thereby lure customers from the retailer who purportedly induced the customer to buy the product by rendering the special
pre-sale services. The argument concludes that the retailer who has suffered
from this diversion will eventually drop the special services, and the manu-

193. A survey of retailers found that 56%1 admitted to "pushing" fair traded lines. Report
of the Select Comm. on Small Business on a Study of Fair Trade, S. REP. No. 2819, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20 (1956).
194. Over one-half of the retailers who quit stocking fair traded items did so because
of poor enforcement. Id. at 14.
195. These-special services should be distinguished from the general services. Special
services are specifically related to a particular product and will only affect that product.

General services, such as air conditioning the premises, storewide guarantee on all merchandise, or smiling clerks would presumably affect all brands in the same way. Manufacturers
would not be interested in fair trade to-protect these general services as there is no direct
benefit to the producer. See Telser, supra note 150, at 89.
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facturer's sales will purportedly fall.196 In essence, fair trade is actually
being used as a promotional device and the only thing being protected is
the manufacturer's sales and profits.
Placed in this perspective, several criticisms can be raised. First, the
protected high margins and resulting higher prices will result in a decrease
in demand, unless it is a differentiated product with a good quality reputation and a price that is controlled solely by the producer. The standardized
product of the competitive producer would only lose sales with the higher
price, regardless of the special services. 197 This results because the retailer
can more easily push the well-known product. The small manufacturer must
rely instead on price competition rather than guaranteed price margins.
Inter-brand competition, consequently, is again decreased rather than promoted.
Second, the fixed margin will allow the retailer who still does not provide the services to make extraordinarily high profits.198 Thus, it is questionable whether fixing the price will really induce all the retailers to provide
the desired special services when the extra margin can just as easily be used
for extra profits.
Moreover, the fixed, fair trade margin may serve to promote deceptiveness in that the high-margin incentive to push the product also creates a
considerable temptation to mislead the consumer or over-sell the product.
Since public control is virtually non-existent, this could be a very real and
ironic problem for a purportedly anti-deceptive law. A final reason manufacturers adopt fair trade is to escape economic coercion in the form of
organized retailer boycotts in which retailers either refuse to stock products
or to advertise and promote them effectively. This might be called "negative
retailer goodwill."' 199
The importance of this situation is twofold. First, without questioning
the morality of retailer boycotts it is evident that in this case fair trade is
being used as a camouflage for horizontal price fixing among retailers200

196. Id.
197. Herman, supra note 185, at 591.
198. Telser, supra note 150, at 92.
199. In the words of an executive of a druggists' association: "All the druggists in
California refused to sell Pepsodent . . . . They put it in the basement. Some were enthusiastic enough to throw it in the ashcan." See Celler Comm. Hearings 93. The classic
case of this coercion was the vicious and destructive campaign waged by the National
Association of Retail Druggists against Pepsodent when the latter decided to drop its
program of resale price maintenance. The coercion was so successful in cutting Pepsodent
out of the California toothpaste market that it was finally forced to readopt resale price
maintenance. NARD was later placated by a $25,000 donation to be used in the promotion
of fair trade legislation. Id. at 98.
200. This same conclusion was reached by the Attorney General's National Committee
To Study the Antitrust Laws. In addition, they found that fair trade (I) goes further
than is necessary to control loss-leader selling by eliminating all price competition on such
commodities, (2) reduces incentive for efficiency in distribution, (3) is unnecessary to
prevent monopolization of distributive outlets, and (4) deprives consumers of the benefits
of price competition in the distribution of goods. They concluded that the Miler-Tydings

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss4/3

36

Hudson: Constitutionality of the Florida Fair Trade Act and Continuing My
1972]

THE FLORIDA FAIR TRADE ACT

despite the adamant assertions of proponents that fair trade allows only
vertical price fixing. That is, fair trade is being used to facilitate the exercise
of monopoly power among retailers. This is expressly contrary to the fundamental concepts of antitrust law and is also contrary to the findings, which
20
specifically prohibit this conduct. 1
Enforcement Problems of Fair Trade. Additional complications arise in
enforcement. Although any person damaged by a willful violation of the fair
trade price can bring suit against the violator,2-0 2 in reality, only the larger
manufacturers can afford to enforce resale price maintenance because of
the extremely high costs and often prolonged litigation involved.20 3 With
such expenditures it becomes readily understandable why small manufacturers referred to fair trade as a luxury available only to the largest manufacturers2 4 and have doubted the profitability of fair trade.205
These enforcement problems, having undoubtedly resulted in uneven
enforcement of price minimums, will have additional ramifications on the
retailers. 206 Large retailers can be more easily policed than smaller retailers who do not advertise their prices as much and who tend to deal with
their customers on a more personal basis. Consequently, smaller retailers
are more likely to cut prices without detection.20 7 Since some small retailers
do not exercise this inadvertent advantage the consequences are paradoxical.
Those who do cut prices achieve a so-called "discriminatory advantage,"
while those adhering to the resale price minimums are unable to meet this
price competition. The violator thus benefits from fair trade while others,
including large rivals, are handicapped in meeting competition by the law
that was supposedly designed to protect them. Since large retailers will
have a wide array of merchandising techniques available, the real loser
becomes the small retailer who has neither.

and McGuire Acts should be repealed and fair trade eliminated. Op. ATr'VY GEN. 153-55

(1955).
201. The findings assert that without fair trade "the monopolist may extort at will from
the consumer, while dictating prices and product quality dilutions to the producter, all contrary to the general welfare and public interest .
FLA. STAT. §541.001 (3) (1969) (emphasis added).
202. FLA. STAT. §541.07 (1969).

203. Reports of annual enforcement costs have been as high as $750,000 and $900,000.
S. RP. No. 2819, supra note 193, at 18.
204. See note 193 supra.
205. When conditions strongly favor price competion, even large and prosperous manu-

facturers may find the enforcement of fair trade prohibitively expensive. Thus, in 1955 a
spokesman for the Sheaffer Pen Company observed, that despite a two-year campaign of
tracking down and carrying out legal proceedings against price cutters and repurchasing
pens from discount houses at a cost in excess of $1 million, "we found that Sheaffer
merchandise still found its way into discount houses . . . . We found that we couldn't
enforce our program vigorously enough so that small retailers were in a position to compete with the discount houses and other [mass] merchandisers." Sheaffer Says It Dropped
Fair Trade So It Could Get Into Discount Houses, ADvERTIsING AcE, Dec. 12, 1955, at 1, 8.

206. Frankel, supra note 141, at 24.
207. Id.
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Fair Trade and the Consumer
It should be evident at this point that the primary effect of fair trade
on the consumer will be somewhat higher prices than those that would
prevail in the absence of fair trade. While the empirical data on this subject
is conflicting,20 8 the most objective and reliable studies have shown prices
in the fair trade states to be generally higher than those in free trade
states. 20 9 Additionally, the real motives of retailer and manufacturer support
for fair trade appear to lay not in preventing deceptiveness or unfair practices, but in assuring the profitability of the present marketing structure
by endeavoring to protect retail margins from the pressures of natural price
competition; that the profit motive is ultimately behind support for fair
trade should come as a surprise to no one. Furthermore, the costs of enforcing such an artificial price structure are great and the burden of these
2 10
expenditures ultimately rests on consumers in terms of higher prices..
If fair trade were to succeed in achieving its latent purposes, it would
serve to protect the inefficient, high cost retailer. In paying the artificially
maintained price the consumer is, in effect, being taxed to subsidize these
inefficient retailers and the undesired services they provide. While the industrious retailer may increase his profitability by further reducing his
costs, and widening his profit margin, he will be unable to pass the benefits on to the consumer.
Summary of Economic Findings on Fair Trade
In reviewing the economic analysis of fair trade it seems appropriate
that a new summary of the findings of fact be drawn up on resale price
maintenance. A more accurate list would be:
(1) Loss-leader selling is not an unfair or deceptive practice. It is
an alternative form of sales promotion available to the small retailer as
well as to the large.
(2) Loss-leader selling does not deteriorate the image of the bona
fide quality product. Quality is based on performance and utility, not on
price.
(3) Price cutting and price wars do not destroy the efficient retailer.
Retail failures are due to inefficiency and incompetency, not to price
cuttings.
(4) Fair trade does not prevent price cutting, but instead serves to
increase its utility and profitability. The violator of fair trade is given
an inadvertent advantage over those adhering to its restrictions because
enforcement is uneven.
208. See Frankel, The Effects of Fair Trade: Fact and Fiction in the Statistical Findings,
28 J. Bus. 182-94 (1955).

209. See Celler Comm. Hearing 433-35, 595, 899.
210. Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L.
REv. 825, 849 (1955); Frankel, note 240 supra.
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(5) To the extent that deceptive and unfair practices exist, antitrust
laws are not only sufficient but are more appropriate. Fair trade does
not distinguish between unfair and normal price competition. It eliminates
all retailer price competition and thus destroys incentive to be efficient.
(6) Price competition is the small retailer's most viable and powerful
competitive tool against the large retailer. Since fair trade eliminates all
retailer level price competition, it gives an advantage to the larger retailer who is more adept at non-price competition. Consequently, fair
trade is an inappropriate means of remedying monopoly power, because
fair trade serves monopoly power.
(7) Loss-leaders, price cutting, and price wars have not led to the
creation of virtual monopolies or great destructive trusts in the retail
markets of the free trade states or the fair trade states.
(8) The increasing mobility of today's consumers has actually increased competition among retailers.
(9) The requirement that fair trade products be in "free and open
competition with commodities of the same general class" is a virtually
meaningless assurance that competition still prevails in view of the extent
of product differentiation today. The consumer is entitled to both retailer and manufacturer levels of price competition.
(10) Most competitive manufacturers cannot use resale price maintenance because it requires a certain degree of monopoly control of
prices. As a result, fair trade consolidates the position of the large manufacturers.
(11) Fair trade is useful only in protecting the artificially priceinduced image of the negative price elastic product. A valid quality
reputation does not need resale price maintenance.
(12) Fair trade is not necessary to protect the manufacturers' retail
distribution.
(13) Fair trade is useful only for protecting the special services of
the monopolistically-competitive producers.
(14) High resale price maintenance margins may promote deceptive
pushing of fair trade products.
(15) Fair trade facilitates monopolistic coercion of manufacturers by
retailer association.
(16) Fair trade is a guise for horizontal price fixing among retailers.
(17) Fair trade is expensive to enforce. This serves to further limit
the utility of fair trade to the larger manufacturers. Enforcement costs
also increase resale prices.
(18) Fair trade encourages higher than necessary profit margins and
resale prices. The high fair trade prices have a regressive effect on the
low-income consumer.
(19) Fair trade serves only the interest of an extremely limited
number of retailers and manufacturers. It is detrimental to the interest
of the majority.
(20) Fair trade is detrimental to consumer interests.
(21) Fair trade generally has monopolistic predilections.
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(22) Fair trade is an inappropriate public policy during both depressionary and inflationary periods. There is no economic or social
justification for fair trade.
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF TE

FLORIDA FAIR TRADE AcT

The summary of the economic findings of fact on resale price maintenance
make it evident that fair trade is virtually void of any purpose or public
interest. It unfairly protects a select group of large manufacturers and
retailers at the expense of the majority of producers, retailers, and consumers. Being void of any public purpose and detrimental to the general
welfare of the citizens of Florida, fair trade is not within the police power
of this state.
Despite the elimination of the nonsigner clause, the Florida Fair Trade
Act continues to have sufficient vitality to level unequal fortunes of the
citizens of Florida in violation of the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Florida Constitution. The Florida Fair Trade Act is just
as unconstitutional today as it was April 5, 1949. The inescapable economic
and legal conclusion is that the Florida Fair Trade Act should be abolished
as soon as possible. This misnamed statute has been on the books thirty-four
years too long.
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